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Abstract 
Fire disasters are among the most dangerous accidents in the chemical and 
hydrocarbon processing industry. Fires have been the source of major accidents 
such as the Piper Alpha disaster (1976), the BP Texas City disaster (2005), the 
Buncefield oil depot fire (2005), Puerto Rico’s fire accident (2009), and the Jaipur 
fire accident (2009). The catastrophic impact of fire accidents necessitates a 
detailed understanding of the mechanisms of their occurrence and evolution in a 
complex engineering system. Detailed understanding will help develop fire 
prevention and control strategies.  
This thesis aims to provide a detailed understanding of fire risk in the hydrocarbon 
production and processing industry. In order to realize this objective, the work 
presented in the thesis includes three parts: i) Developing a procedure to study 
potential fire accident scenarios in an offshore facility with different ignition 
source locations. This procedure helps to design safety measures. The 
effectiveness of safety measures is verified using a computational fluid dynamics 
(CFD) code. This work emphasizes that an FLNG layout must be considered with 
the utmost care since it is the most effective measure in limiting a potential LNG 
release and subsequent dispersion effect, and directly influences the fire dynamics 
and thus limits the potential damage. ii) An integrated probabilistic model for fire 
accident analysis considering the time-dependent nature of the fire is developed. 
The developed model captures the dynamics of fire evolution using three distinct 
techniques Bayesian networks, Petri Nets, and a CFD model. The Bayesian 
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network captures the logical dependence of fire causation factors. The Petri Net 
captures the time-dependent evolution of a fire scenario. The CFD model captures 
the dimension and impact of the fire accident scenario. The results in this work 
show that a time-dependent probability analysis model is necessary for fire 
accidents. iii) Whether fire alone can cause a domino effect is demystified in the 
last work. A solid-flame model is used in a CFD framework to calculate the 
escalation vector for a domino effect; escalation probability is assessed using a 
probit model. The results demonstrate that a pool fire alone sometimes may not 
cause a domino effect in the current industry. It is other factors, such as explosion 
and hydrocarbon leakage, work together with a pool fire to escalate into a domino 
event, for example, the results shown in the case study of the Jaipur fire accident. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Overview of fire accidents 
Fire is among the most common and devastating accidents in the hydrocarbon 
production and processing industry. Disastrous fire accidents which have occurred 
indicate that attention must be paid to the safety area associated with fire accidents.  
In the Piper Alpha disaster, 167 people were killed [1]. The Piper Alpha is an oil 
production platform in the North Sea. In July 1988, an explosion occurred on the 
Piper Alpha platform and caused a serious fire accident which destroyed the whole 
platform. The total insured loss was about $3.4 billion. This accident is considered 
as the worst offshore oil disaster in terms of lives lost and industry impact [2]. The 
Texas City Refinery explosion occurred on March 23, 2005 [3]. A hydrocarbon 
vapour cloud was ignited, and then an explosion occurred at BP's Texas City 
refinery in Texas City. In addition, an area estimated at 200,000 square feet of the 
refinery was badly burned by the subsequent fire that followed the violent 
explosion. This accident caused 15 workers dead and 180 injuries. The equipment 
in the refinery was also severely damaged, which caused millions of dollars loss. 
The Buncefield oil depot fire occurred on December 2005. This disaster was a 
major fire accident caused by a series of explosions. Followed by the first 
explosion, a series of further explosions occurred and overwhelmed over twenty 
tanks in the depot. The fire lasted for two days and caused a huge loss of assets 
and harm to the environment [4]. In October 2009, a large explosion occurred at 
2 
 
the Caribbean Petroleum Corporation (CAPECO) oil refinery and oil depot in 
Bayamón, Puerto Rico [5]. Three people were injured in this accident, but 
fortunately, no fatality was reported. The accident started with an overflowed 
gasoline storage tank in the tank farm; then, a 107-acre vapour cloud formed 
quickly over the facility after the fuel aerosolized. The vapour cloud was ignited 
subsequently in the wastewater treatment area of the facility and led to a huge 
explosion. Multiple tank fires followed the explosion and burned for nearly 60 
hours. Due to the subsequent explosions and fire, 17 of the 48 petroleum storage 
tanks were damaged significantly.  
 
1.2 Goal of the Research 
As discussed in the previous section, fire accidents happened many times in the 
world in the last few decades. These accidents caused huge damage to human life, 
assets, and environment. These accidents remind us to pay more attention to it. In 
order to better understand fire accidents, and then try to mitigate and even avoid 
it, it is necessary to conduct a risk assessment of it. The goal of this research is to 
analyze the fire accidents in the chemical and hydrocarbon processing industry 
and conduct risk assessment, which aims to provide a detailed understanding of 
fire risk in the hydrocarbon production and processing industry. 
 
1.3 Overview of the fire accident simulation  
To assess the risk of the fire accident, the first step is to simulate the fire accident 
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accurately. In order to simulate the fire accident, several models have been 
proposed, such as a point-source model, solid-flame model, numerical model, 
integral model, and zone model [6]. In this section, three famous models, including 
the point-source model, solid flame model, and numerical model, are discussed 
below  
1.3.1 Point-source models  
The point-source model considers that the heat load only originates from a point 
source, ignoring the shape of the flame [6]. This model is a simplified model; the 
physical characteristics of the fuel and the distance from the center of the flame to 
the target equipment are the main factors that affect the heat flux calculated by this 
model. However, this model usually overestimates the heat flux during application. 
It is suggested to apply this model in cases when the distance from the center of 
the flame is 10 radii [6]. 
1.3.2 Solid flame models 
The solid flame model is a classical semi-empirical model that is widely used due 
to its simple application and accurate results. A solid flame model assumes that 
the heat flux only originates from the surface of the flame with a specific solid 
shape [6]. For example, in the case of a pool fire accident, the flame shape is 
assumed to be cylindrical; in the case of a jet fire, the flame shape is assumed to 
be a cone. Based on these assumptions, the emitting power is calculated 
accordingly. Thus, the heat flux caused by a fire accident can be worked out as a 
function of the surface-emitting power. Other contributing parameters such as the 
view factor and the atmospheric transmissivity, are also calculated, using 
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empirical or semi-empirical methods.  
1.3.3 Numerical model 
Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) models, also known as field models, are 
based on the numerical solution of Reynolds-Average Navier-Stokes equations. 
Compared with other models such as point-source models or the solid-flame 
model, a CFD model can provide a more accurate result, although a large 
computation time may be required [6, 7]. Currently, several CFD models can be 
used for fire simulation, such as FDS, FLACS, ANSYS FLUENT, AND ANSYS 
CFX. The principal differences among these models were analyzed and are shown 
in Table 1-1 [8].  
Table 1-1 Comparative analysis of FDS, FLUENT, and CFX [8] 
 
FDS ANSYS FLUENT ANSYS CFX 
Discretizati
on method 
Finite-volume 
method: cell-
centered method 
Finite-volume 
method: cell-centered 
method 
Finite-volume 
method: vertex-
centered 
method 
Mesh Rectilinear mesh, 
all objects need to 
be represented by 
cuboids 
Various mesh could 
be selected according 
to the shape of objects 
to give higher 
accuracy than FDS in 
meshing 
Various mesh could 
be selected according 
to the shape of objects 
to give higher 
accuracy than FDS in 
meshing 
Model Combustion model 
using a single step, 
mixing-controlled 
chemical reaction 
which uses three 
lumped species 
Abundant physical 
models 
Abundant physical 
models 
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Turbulence 
Model 
For low-speed, 
thermally driven 
flow with an 
emphasis on smoke 
and heat. 
Turbulence is 
treated by Large 
Eddy Simulation 
(LES) or Direct 
Numerical 
Simulation (DNS) 
A wide range of 
turbulence models can 
be selected according 
to different situations 
including k-ε model, 
k-w model, LES 
model 
A wide range of 
turbulence models 
can be selected 
according to different 
situations 
Application Specialty tool 
developed to study 
the fire dynamics  
Used widely Used widely 
 
Many previous studies have been conducted using CFD models to simulate and 
analyze fire accidents. Also, the results by CFD models have been well validated 
by many studies and experiments.  
Hansen et al. [9] used FLACS to develop a CFD model to validate the studies of 
LNG-vapour dispersion, designing a pool-spread model considering  humidity 
and other effects. In the study conducted by Dadashzadeh et al., an integrated 
approach for fire and explosion simulation was proposed; the evaporation and 
dispersion of flammable gas and delayed ignition were simulated using FLACS, 
while the Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) code was used to model the ignition of 
the rest of the fuel over the liquid pool [10]. Pitblado et al. used PHAST to predict 
the hazard zone caused by an accident or deliberate attack, and they also developed 
a range of credible scenarios in this study [11]. Baalisampang et al. conducted a 
study on fire occurring on a typical FLNG processing facility and its impact on 
personnel and assets using the FDS code; a water deluge system was used to 
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mitigate the impact of fire [12]. Also, they identified three credible scenarios and 
determined the impact of fire on personnel and assets by combining the FDS code 
and probit method [13]. An inherently safe layout design which highlights the 
importance of improved layout design and passive control strategies are also 
proposed by Baalisampang et al. [14]. Van Hees listed many previous validation 
studies and conducted several simulations to validate the FDS model. The results 
of these studies show good correspondence between FDS simulation and 
experiment results [15]. Berg et al. used a CFD model to identify an optimal safety 
design for an FPSO to quantify the overpressure caused by an explosion and also 
assessed the risk reduction measures using a quantitative method. The effects of 
barrier walls, separation gaps, and other influencing factors were discussed in this 
study [16]. Binbin conducted a comparative analysis of fire simulation using 
FLUENT and FDS, and found that although Fluent and CFX have more extensive 
simulation areas and other advantages in terms of meshing, the FDS results have 
good high consistency with measured results in some situations [17].  
In this research, various CFD models are applied in different situations considering 
data availability, meshing ability, and result post-processing ability. FDS, FLACS, 
and ANSYS FLUENT are selected as the CFD model in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, 
respectively. 
 
1.4 Fire accidents in an offshore facility  
An FLNG is an offshore facility designed to employ various LNG development 
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technologies, including gas extraction, gas pre-treatment, natural gas liquefaction, 
condensate treatment, water treatment, LNG storage, and LNG offloading [18]. 
Since all these technologies are combined in only one offshore facility, the FLNG 
has a very congested and complicated layout. This characteristic of the FLNG 
makes fire accidents occurring in an FLNG can be extremely dangerous; they can 
cause significant damage to personnel, the structure, and assets [12-14, 19]. Fire 
accidents that have occurred in offshore facilities with similarly complex and 
congested areas such as the Piper Alpha disaster[1] and the BP Deepwater Horizon 
explosion[20] remind us to focus on the area of fire accidents occurring in an 
offshore facility such as an FLNG.  
In this research, a typical FLNG is used for case studies to explore fire risk in 
Chapters 2 and 3. 
 
1.5 Domino effect caused by fire accidents 
The domino effect is responsible for a number of severe accidents in the chemical 
and process industry [21-23].  
Compared with stand-alone accidents, domino effects are more likely to cause 
huge damage to personnel assets, humans, and the environment. As shown in 
previous research, the frequency of the domino effect has increased in the chemical 
and process industries in the last few decades [24, 25]. These accidents caused by 
a domino effect, such as the BP Deepwater Horizon explosion[20], the Buncefield 
oil depot fire[4], the CAPECO explosion and fire accident [5], and Jaipur’s fire 
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accident [26] have indicated the domino effect’s huge damage to society and 
focused people’s attention on accidents caused by the domino effect. Among all 
kinds of accident scenarios, the pool fire is often blamed as one of the primary 
accidents that trigger a domino event[27-32]. 
There are several previous studies that focused on the domino effect caused by 
pool fires. Khan and Abbasi conducted a series of studies on the domino effect, in 
which the pool fire is one of the principal accident scenarios that can escalate into 
a domino effect [24, 25, 33-35]. In one of these studies, Khan and Abbasi 
considered two failure modes failure of the equipment due to high-pressure build-
up and equipment rupture due to material failure, to be the main failure modes of 
a vessel exposed to fire. They also derived a series of analytical formulas to 
calculate the escalation probability of a domino effect in cases of fire accidents 
[25]. The computational fluid dynamics (CFD) model was used by Jujuly et al. to 
simulate an LNG pool fire, and the effect on the adjacent equipment was analyzed. 
In this study, the authors found wind speed can affect the pool fire significantly 
and may cause a domino effect [28]. Landucci et al. studied the damage probability 
of equipment in domino events triggered by the fire. They proposed a simplified 
model to estimate the vessel time to failure (ttf) in the case of thermal radiation 
[30]. Furthermore, a series of probit models have been proposed by Cozzani et al. 
to analyze the escalation probability of a domino effect caused by various accident 
scenarios, which provides a simplified method for probabilistic assessment [21, 
31]. In several studies by Khakzad et al., the dynamic Bayesian network (DBN) 
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and the probit method proposed by Cozzani et al. were used to analyze the 
propagation sequence of a domino effect, which considered the time-dependent 
feature of the domino effect [27, 29, 36]. 
1.6 Research Gap and Objectives of the Research 
A review of the literature on previous work shows that although many works have 
been conducted in the area of fire accidents, there are still some research gaps that 
need to be explored. For example, research on the effectiveness of the safety 
measures for fire accident is rare. Given different fire accident scenarios, different 
safety measures may have different performance. In the hydrocarbon production 
and processing industry, various fire scenarios need to be identified, and safety 
measures selection also needs to be assessed. The second challenge lies in 
assessing the fire probability considering its time-dependent feature. Considering 
the fire accident is a process, this feature needs to be identified in the risk 
assessment of fire accidents. The third question with respect to whether or not the 
pool fire alone will cause a domino effect. In the previous studies, the pool fire is 
usually blamed to be one of the main causes of the domino effect. In order to solve 
the problems mentioned above, the thesis includes three specific areas that are 
reflected in three major works. 
The first objective is to assess the safety measures for fire accidents in the 
hydrocarbon production and processing industry, especially in an offshore facility. 
The effectiveness to prevent fires and mitigate their impact of safety measures in 
different fire accident scenarios will be analyzed. 
10 
 
The second research objective aims to propose an integrated probabilistic model 
for fire accident analysis considering the time-dependent nature of the fire. Many 
previous works assessed fire accident likelihood; however, most of these studies 
considered fire probability as spatially distributed, ignoring the time dependence 
of the fire accident scenario. This study proposes a robust and practical model to 
analyze fire accident probability in a congested and complex processing area, 
considering its time-dependent feature.  
The third objective is to demystify whether fire alone can cause a domino effect. 
As mentioned before, a pool fire is usually blamed as one of the reasons that cause 
a domino effect. Also, this study applies simulation to explore which factors 
contribute to the domino effect caused by pool fires. 
 
1.7 Contribution and Novelty of the Research 
In this thesis, three works have been conducted to realize the three objectives 
described above.  
The first work proposes a procedure to study potential fire accident scenarios in 
an offshore facility. In this work, accident scenarios with different ignition source 
locations are analyzed. The effect of different ignition source locations is also 
studied using potential scenarios in this research. In addition, safety measures 
include firewalls and fire suppression systems are analyzed. The ranges of safety 
measures of these fires are also studied to determine their effectiveness to prevent 
fires and mitigate their impact. The uniqueness of this study is the integration of 
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release, dispersion, and fire modeling scenarios, simplifying the fire analysis and 
increasing its effectiveness from the offshore process system design and analysis 
perspectives. 
The second work is to propose an integrated probabilistic model for fire accident 
analysis considering the time-dependent nature of the fire. Many previous works 
assessed fire accident likelihood; however, most of these studies considered fire 
probability as spatially distributed, ignoring the time dependence of the fire 
accident scenario. This study proposes a robust and practical model to analyze fire 
accident probability in a congested and complex processing area, considering its 
time-dependent feature. The novelty of this work is that the model integrates a 
conditional probability approach – the Bayesian network (BN) - with a time-
dependent scenario evolution approach, Stochastic Petri Nets (SPN), and the 
computational fluid dynamics (CFD) serves as an accurate technique to 
incorporate all on-site variables.  
The third work is to demystify whether fire alone can cause a domino effect. As 
mentioned before, a pool fire is usually blamed as one of the reasons that cause a 
domino effect. This study applies simulation to explore which factors contribute 
to the domino effect caused by pool fires. In addition, case studies based on real 
accidents are conducted to assess the escalation probability of the domino effect 
caused by pool fires in current industries.  
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1.8 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is written in manuscript format. It includes two manuscripts submitted 
to peer-reviewed journals, and one manuscript is ready to be submitted and 
published. The manuscript in chapter 2 is submitted to the Ocean Engineering 
journal; the manuscript in chapter 3 is submitted to the Fire Safety Journal; the 
manuscript in chapter 4 is going to be submitted to a peer-reviewed journal and 
published. The outline of each chapter is explained below:  
Chapter 1 is a brief introduction to the possible scenarios caused by fire risks and 
several models that can be used to simulate the fire risk. The research objectives 
of the research are mentioned in this section. 
Chapter 2 is based on the first objective. A numerical model, FDS, which is a 
commercial software designed specifically for fire modeling, is applied to simulate 
the fire accident. This study presents a rigorous procedure to study potential 
accident scenarios in an offshore facility. Fourteen scenarios with different 
ignition source locations are explored. In addition, the ranges of safety measures 
are also studied to determine their effectiveness to prevent fires and mitigate their 
impact. This work provides a simple and efficient way to analyze the impact of 
key design parameters. 
Chapter 3 is based on the second objective. For this study, an integrated model is 
proposed to assess the probability of fire accidents considering their time-
dependent features. The proposed model integrates a conditional probability 
approach – the Bayesian network (BN) - with a time-dependent scenario evolution 
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approach, Stochastic Petri Nets (SPN). In addition, the CFD tool is used to 
estimate the time-dependent scenario consequences. The outcome of the model is 
fire probability as a function of time and location caused by a specific leak rate 
and leak duration. 
Chapter 4 is based on the third objective. In this investigation, the possibility that 
pool fires alone cause a domino effect is explored. Two models, a solid-flame 
model and a numerical model, are applied to simulate the heat load caused by pool 
fires. A probit model is used to assess the escalation probability of the domino 
effect caused by pool fires. Several potentially influencing factors that have effects 
on pool fire results are explored in a sensitivity study. In addition, two case studies 
based on real accidents are conducted to analyze the pool fire’s impact on the 
current industry. 
Chapter 5 summarizes the results of the research. Based on the conclusion of the 
work in chapters 2, 3, and 4, it provides several potential research scopes in this 
area for future work.  
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Chapter 2. A Numerical Fire Simulation Approach for Effectiveness 
Analysis of Fire Safety Measures in Floating Liquefied Natural Gas 
Facilities1 
Co-authorship statement  
A version of this manuscript has been accepted for publication in the Journal of 
Ocean Engineering in 2018. Author Ruochen Yang has conducted this study under 
the direct supervision of Faisal Khan. Ruochen Yang has developed the model and 
conducted test runs under the guidance of author Faisal Khan. Authors Faisal Khan 
and Ming Yang helped test the model results and verified the developed model. 
Authors Depeng Kong and Changhang Xu helped conduct the application. All co-
authors reviewed and provided feedback on the manuscript. Ruochen Yang 
revised the manuscript based on the co-authors’ feedback and during the peer 
review process. 
 
Abstract 
The fire remains a serious threat to a floating liquefied natural gas facility. It is of 
greater concern, given the remote locations and limited accessibility of emergency 
 
 
1 Yang, R., Khan, F., Yang, M., Kong, D., & Xu,  C. (2018). A numerical fire simulation approach for 
effectiveness analysis of fire safety measures in floating liquefied natural gas facilities. Ocean Engineering, 
157, 219-233. 
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services. This study aims to present a rigorous procedure to study potential 
accident scenarios in an offshore (floating processing) facility with different 
ignition source locations and verify the effectiveness of safety measures using 
computational fluid dynamics code. The uniqueness of the present study is the 
integration of release, dispersion, and fire modeling scenarios, simplifying the fire 
analysis and increasing its effectiveness from the offshore process system design 
and analysis perspectives. The first step of the procedure is to identify the range 
of potential release scenarios and their strength of dispersion in confined and semi-
confined spaces. Subsequently, potential fire scenarios are analyzed considering 
the influence of the location. Computational fluid dynamics models are used to 
analyze these three steps of the scenarios. The application of the procedure is 
demonstrated on an offshore facility by analyzing 14 credible scenarios. The 
ranges of safety measures of these fires are also studied to determine their 
effectiveness to prevent fires and mitigate their impact. This study provides a 
simple and efficient way to analyze the impact of key design parameters. In this 
study, the transition from fire to explosion is not considered and all the 
environmental factors are assumed to be constants in the simulation. 
 
  
16 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Global energy demand is continuously rising. Natural gas is one of the cleanest 
sources of energy, and its demand is sharply rising. Because of the growing 
demand, many oil companies are currently increasing their investment in floating 
liquefied natural gas (FLNG) facilities such as Floating Storage and Regasification 
Units (LNG FSRU) and Floating Production Storage and Offloading (LNG FPSO). 
With the development of shipbuilding and offshore industries, the concept of the 
FLNG was recently proposed[37]. An FLNG facility uses various types of 
technologies developed for conventional land-based LNG, offshore oil and gas, 
and marine transport industries[38]. An FLNG facility can implement gas 
extraction, gas pre-treatment, natural gas liquefaction, condensate treatment, water 
treatment, LNG storage, LNG offloading and combined technologies in one 
offshore facility, which creates a congested and complicated layout[18]. 
Fire and explosion accidents such as the Piper Alpha disaster[1], the BP Texas 
City disaster[3], the BP Deepwater Horizon explosion[20], the Cleveland 
explosion[39] and Buncefield oil depot fire[4] have demonstrated the importance 
of safety in oil and gas operations. In a typical onshore oil refinery or chemical 
plant, hazardous facilities are usually separated from other parts of the plant. 
However, on an FLNG, facilities have to be arranged in a congested layout. While 
this layout brings economic and environmental benefits[40], it has a higher fire 
risk compared to a conventional natural gas processing unit[41]. In addition, 
offshore and remote operations usually have limited infrastructure and resources 
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support. All these make it more challenging to assure fire safety in offshore 
facilities.  
Fire accidents caused by flammable hydrocarbons’ leakage have been well studied 
by many researchers[9, 10, 42-51]. The overpressure resulting from a flammable 
gas explosion is not significant in open areas, while places with confined layouts 
are dangerous[10]. Luketa-Hanlin[46] studied the behaviour of LNG spills and 
pool formations on water and discussed the modeling of LNG spills, taking 
combustion events such as pool fires and vapour cloud fires into consideration. 
Fay constructed a model to predict the dynamics of spills from LNG and oil 
tankers. The pool fire area, duration, and heat release rate were determined using 
this model[47]. Jet fires, explosions, and flash fires occurring on the topside of 
LNG-FPSOs were analyzed considering different leakage hole sizes. It can be 
concluded that even though the LNG is safe enough under ALARP criteria, there 
is a need to select independent protection layers to meet a higher standard[48]. Sun 
validated the CFD model of fire radiation by comparing the simulation results and 
experimental data, followed by a hazard analysis of an LNG Satellite station. The 
distance between dike walls and AVV banks was suggested to be enlarged by the 
author[49]. Hissong described the key factors used to model an LNG spill on the 
water; the results from pool fires on land were compared with the results of pool 
fires on water[50].  
Using computational fluid dynamics (CFD) tools to model the consequences of 
fire accidents and conduct an analysis has been well validated by many studies and 
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experiments. Dadashzadeh et al. proposed an integrated approach for fire and 
explosion simulation; FLACS was used to simulate the evaporation and dispersion 
of flammable gas and delayed ignition, while the Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) 
code was used to model the ignition of the rest of the fuel over the liquid pool[10]. 
Baalisampang et al. used the FDS code to study fire occurring on a typical FLNG 
processing facility and its impact on personnel and assets. In his study, a water 
deluge system was applied to mitigate the impact of fire[12]. In another study 
conducted by Baalisampang et al., three credible scenarios were identified, and the 
impact of fire on personnel and assets was determined by combining the FDS code 
and probit method[13]. Baalisampang et al. also proposed a method to determine 
an inherently safe layout design and highlight the importance of improved layout 
design and passive control strategies[14]. In the study conducted by Hansen et al. 
[9], FLACS was used to develop a CFD model to validate the studies of LNG-
vapour dispersion; humidity and other effects were considered in this study to 
design a pool- spread model. PHAST was used by Pitblado et al. to predict the 
hazard zone caused by an accident or deliberate attack; a range of credible 
scenarios was developed in this study[11]. Berg et al. identified an optimal safety 
design for an FPSO by using a CFD model to quantify the overpressure an 
explosion can cause and also assessed the risk reduction measures using a 
quantitative method. The effects of barrier walls, separation gaps, and other 
influencing factors were discussed in this study[16]. Van Hees listed many 
previous validation studies and also conducted several simulations to validate the 
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FDS model. The results of these studies show good correspondence between FDS 
simulation and experiment results[15]. Binbin conducted a comparative analysis 
by fire simulation using FLUENT and FDS, and found that although Fluent and 
CFX have more extensive simulation areas and other advantages in terms of 
meshing, the result of FDS has high consistency with measured results in some 
situations[17]. Table 1-1 shows the main differences of FDS, FLUENT and CFX. 
In this study the fire analysis is mainly based on the FDS code- a specialty CFD 
tool developed to study fire dynamics.  
Many previous studies have explored natural gas fire accidents[9, 11, 12, 46, 47, 
50, 52] with a focus on leakage parameters such as the leakage point, leakage 
probability, release rate and environmental parameters such as wind speed and 
direction. However, these studies ignore the impact of the location of the ignition 
source. In this study, the influence of the effect of the ignition source location is 
mainly considered.  
The objective of this study is to present a rigorous procedure to study potential 
accident scenarios in an offshore floating processing facility with different ignition 
source locations and verify the effectiveness of safety measures based on the 
consequences of potential FLNG fire accident scenarios. The scenarios with 
different ignition source locations are modeled using the FDS code under the 
assumption that all the environmental factors are constants in the simulation. 
Another unique aspect of the present study is consideration of a fire’s impact using 
areas of influence and temperature distribution. Safety measures (firewalls and fire 
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suppression systems) are analyzed for their effectiveness in mitigating the effect 
of fire. A limitation of this study is that it does not consider the transition from fire 
to an explosion during the simulation. 
2.2 Proposed Methodology 
This study focuses on the simulation of fires caused by ignition sources located in 
different places on an FLNG and the verification of the effectiveness of safety 
measures. It incorporates the release and dispersion modeling of an LNG for the 
development of various credible scenarios and employs CFD simulations for each 
scenario to analyze the fire’s impact on the FLNG to determine the most dangerous 
scenario. This is followed by the implementation of safety measures such as a 
firewall and automatic fire suppression system to mitigate the fire’s impact on 
human beings, adjacent assets, and structures. Figure 2-1 demonstrates the 
procedure of this study. 
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Figure 2-1 The Flow Chart of the present Study 
 
2.2.1 Step 1: Scenario Development 
When developing a credible scenario, many parameters which could contribute to 
a fire must be considered, such as miscellaneous parameters (pressure, temperature 
and humidity), fuel parameters (chemical and physical properties), leak 
parameters (rate, location, duration and direction), wind parameters (speed and 
direction) and so on. In order to study the impact of locations of ignition sources 
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on safety measure design, all the parameters except the location of the ignition 
source remain unchanged in all scenarios developed in this study. The users of this 
approach may choose other parameters that are not limited to those used in this 
study.  
2.2.2 Step 2: Fuel Release and Dispersion Analysis 
Fire occurs when the concentration of gas fuel reaches the combustion limit[53]. 
It is considered that the combustion limit of natural gas is 5 – 15%[54]. The release 
and dispersion simulations are conducted using the FDS model in this study to 
determine the distribution of the concentration of gas fuel so that the size of the 
fuel vapour cloud can be calculated to develop credible scenarios. 
LNG released from a tank can vaporize quickly due to the ambient temperature. 
LNG vaporization occurs in two ways[43]: (1) heat transfer from the ambient 
temperature when no fuel is ignited; (2) heat transfer from the fire occurring in the 
surrounding area when natural gas is ignited. Natural gas is a combustible 
hydrocarbon gas mixture, formed primarily of methane, ethane, propane, butane, 
pentane, and sometimes a small percentage of carbon dioxide, nitrogen, hydrogen 
sulfide, or helium[50]. In this study, it is assumed that natural gas is mainly 
composed of methane. 
In FDS, Lagrangian particles are used to represent objects that cannot be resolved 
on the numerical grid[55]. Liquid droplets are the most common example. In this 
study, the liquid fuel is LNG and needs to be represented by Lagrangian particles. 
A sprinkler is used to represent the fuel release from a hole in the tank in this study. 
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In this FDS simulation, a mixture of gas species such as air is simplified as a 
lumped species, which is considered to transport and react together. Therefore, 
only one transport equation needs to be solved for this “lumped species”. The 
transport equation for both lumped species and a single species utilized by FDS is 
shown in Equation (2.1)[56].  
  (2.1) 
where:  is the mass density, t is the time, 𝐮 is the velocity vector,  is the 
mass fraction of lumped species α,  is the diffusivity of species α,  is the 
mass production rate per unit volume of species α by chemical reactions, and  
is the mass production rate per unit volume of species α by evaporating 
droplets/particles. 
 
2.2.3 Step 3: Fire Consequence Analysis  
Eliminating the existence of ignition sources can prevent a fire. However, there 
are many types of ignition sources that cannot be completely identified and 
eliminated[53]. Thus, it is necessary to investigate how ignition sources would 
affect the potential consequences of FLNG fire accidents.  
This study focuses on the impact of an ignition source’s location on the 
consequences caused by fire. All parameters except the location of the ignition 
source remain unchanged to find the most dangerous scenarios caused by different 
ignition sources’ location. Considering the results of the release and dispersion 
model, various credible scenarios can be developed. 
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The FDS code is used to conduct simulations of various credible scenarios. FDS 
is a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) model of fire-driven fluid flow, 
developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). FDS has 
been validated by NIST and also by a large number of studies and experiments[57-
59]. To decrease the computational cost, most combustion models in FDS use a 
single step, the mixing-controlled, infinitely fast chemical reaction of lumped 
species. Each reaction using a simple chemistry model is assumed to be of the 
form as in Equation (2.2)[55].  
 CX𝐻𝑌𝑂𝑍𝑁𝑉 + 𝑉𝑂2𝑂2 → 𝑉𝐶𝑂2𝐶𝑂2 + 𝑉𝐻2𝑂𝐻2𝑂 + 𝑉𝐶𝑂CO + VS𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑡 + 𝑉𝑁2𝑁2(2.2) 
Temperature and the concentration of fuel gas caused by the leakage and 
combustion in various scenarios are extracted from the simulation to conduct a 
detailed fire analysis. The thermal radiation model used in FDS is defined by 
Equation (2.3) and (2.4)[56].  
  (2.3) 
  (2.4) 
where  is the absorption coefficient,  is the source term; 
 is the solution of the radiation transport equation (RTE) for a non-
scattering gray gas and is explained in Equation (2.5).  
  (2.5) 
To validate the FDS code, a set of simulations with known conditions reported in 
the literature was conducted. The results obtained were compared with the results 
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reported in the literature. They showed good agreement. This partially validates 
the FDS code. 
According to the previous studies[12, 60], at 538℃, the yield strength of steel will 
be reduced to approximately 60% of its normal value, which does not have the 
ability to support the steel structure’s function, according to the American Institute 
for Steel Construction (AISC)[61]. In this study, a temperature higher than 538℃ 
is defined as dangerous, while the area that the dangerous temperature caused by 
a fire can reach is defined as the dangerous zone. 
In the current study, the fire’s impact on adjacent assets and structures is evaluated 
through these aspects: the maximum temperature the fire can cause, the duration 
of the dangerous temperature and the size of the dangerous zone. 
2.2.4 Step 4: Safety Measure Design and Effectiveness Analysis  
Considering the serious impact of fire on adjacent assets and structures, some 
safety measures, including active and passive measures, are used to mitigate this 
impact. Apart from applying active safer designs, passive measures, including 
protective equipment, cannot be ignored, due to the chemical properties of 
flammable hydrogen. The term passive measures refers to designs that could 
mitigate the impact of accidents. Among these safety measures, firewalls, water 
deluge systems, and carbon dioxide fire suppression systems are considered 
effective methods to mitigate the impact of fire. 
In this section, the simulations are conducted using the FDS code after applying 
safety measures. Three evaluation aspects are used to analyze the impact of fire: 
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the maximum temperature the fire can cause, the duration of the dangerous 
temperature and the size of the dangerous zone. The results from the FDS 
simulation are used to compare with the results from the simulation without 
applying any safety measure, to study the effect that safety measures would have 
on the fire. 
2.2.4.1 Firewall 
In traditional onshore chemical plants, each module is separately located at an 
adequate distance. However, in offshore facilities, due to their compact layouts, 
firewalls are typically used to implement segregation[62]. In this study, the 
firewall is installed around the leakage tank to prevent the spread of fuel and fire. 
2.2.4.2 Fire Suppression System  
An auto fire suppression system is an effective way to provide protection against 
fire. In the current study, in order to effectively mitigate the impact of fire on 
adjacent assets and structures, a carbon dioxide fire suppression system, as well as 
a water deluge system, is installed on an FLNG facility. 
A carbon dioxide fire suppression system is also a reliable way to mitigate the 
impact of fire. Carbon dioxide is a colourless, odourless, electrically non-
conductive, and easily available gas that is highly efficient as a fire suppression 
agent. While a water spray could reduce the temperature by water evaporation, 
carbon dioxide can be used to reduce the flammable gas concentration and thus 
smother fires. This method to extinguish a fire is called Clean Agent Fire 
Suppression by the National Fire Protection Association[63]. In this study, the 
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carbon dioxide fire suppression system is installed according to the NFPA 2001. 
2.3 Application of the Methodology 
2.3.1 Step 1: Scenario Development 
The geometry of the target offshore structure is an FLNG processing facility, 
shown in Figure 2-2. The information for the target offshore structure is extracted 
from a typical FLNG processing facility. The target structure model is comprised 
of a life module, central control room and helicopter deck, process and utility 
modules, hull and ship systems, a turret and fluid transmission control rotary joint 
and mooring and riser systems. Among them, the processing unit is considered 
one of the most hazardous areas and needs more attention[41]. In this study, liquid 
fuel is assumed to be released from a tank in the process and utility modules, 
considering its higher risk. 
The simulation volume is set as 72m*80m*36m and the grid cell is 
0.5m*0.5m*0.5m. The total number of grid cells in each scenario is 1658880. 
Figure 2-3 shows the simulation area in the target structure. According to Ichard 
et al., a finer, as well as a coarse grid cell, have been used in sensitivity studies to 
guarantee that the grid solution is independent of the cell size[51]. A coarse mesh 
with 964800 cells and a fine mesh with 1878750 cells were selected. Figure 2-4 
shows good correspondence between the simulation results of temperature 
changes over time in certain slice files with different meshes. The simulation 
period of 60 seconds is considered for each scenario. Higher simulation duration 
may be considered; however, in the present study, simulation results did not make 
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much difference. Therefore, this scenario is restricted to a first-minute simulation. 
In the current study, the ambient pressure is set to be atmospheric pressure and the 
ambient temperature is set to be 5 degrees Celsius, considering cold region 
operating conditions. Wind speed is assumed to be 3m/s and the wind comes from 
the +X axis, while the atmospheric stability class is D, which is a credible scenario, 
according to Pitblado et al. [42]. For release factors, the leakage point is assumed 
to be on the tank in the process and utility modules. LNG is released at the speed 
of 10m/s due to the inner pressure of the tank and considering the high wind zone 
offshore. According to Pitblado et al.’s study, the maximum credible hole caused 
by accidental operational events is 750mm[42]. The release rate of LNG can be 
calculated using 10m/s and 750mm as the release velocity and hole size. Instead 
of treating release as instantaneous or at a constant rate, as in most studies, the 
release rate in this study is treated as a time-varying value. The release starts at 0s, 
gradually reaches the specified rate at 3 seconds and then remains constant. From 
57s, the release rate decreases gradually and finally stops. 
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Figure 2-2 The FLNG Structure  
 
 
Figure 2-3 The simulation area 
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Figure 2-4 Sensitivity study result 
 
2.3.2 Step 2: Release and Dispersion Simulation 
In the dispersion simulation, the ambient pressure is set to be atmospheric pressure 
and the ambient temperature is set to be 5 degrees Celsius (considering cold region 
operating conditions). The wind speed is 3m/s, and the wind comes from the +X 
axis. Ten planes are selected and evenly distributed on an X axis to show the 
concentration of gas fuel. Based on the results of the simulation, LNG vaporizes 
quickly after release from the tank, due to conditions in the surrounding 
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environment. With wind action, natural gas disperses quickly and in 
approximately 20 seconds, natural gas covers most of the entire simulation area. 
In actual offshore operation, the release rate and leakage point may change, and 
environmental factors such as wind speed and temperature might cause natural gas 
to vaporize and disperse at an even higher speed. Figure 2-5 shows an example of 
the results using the FDS code. 
 
(a)  10s 
 
(b)  30s 
 
(c)  50s 
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Figure 2-5 An Example of Slice File of Concentration at Different Times 
 
2.3.3 Step 3: Fire Simulation and Analysis 
The area where the concentration of gas fuel within the flammable limit is selected 
as a credible fire scenario, based on the results of the release and dispersion 
simulation. A total of fourteen different accident scenarios with different locations 
of the ignition source in the process and utility module are developed in this study. 
While only one scenario is developed on the second deck because of the lower 
likelihood that the gas fuel can disperse to the second deck according to the result 
from dispersion and release result, 13 ignition locations are evenly developed 
throughout the first deck. The FDS code is used to conduct a fire simulation for 
each scenario. Table 2-1 describes the 14 credible scenarios with different 
locations. Figure 2-6 shows the location of the ignition source.  
Table 2-1 The Location of the Ignition Sources 
 X(m) Y(m) Z(m) 
Scenario 1 11 10 4 
Scenario 2 11 22 4 
Scenario 3 11 34 4 
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Scenario 4 23 10 4 
Scenario 5 23 22 4 
Scenario 6 23 34 4 
Scenario 7 35 10 4 
Scenario 8 35 22 4 
Scenario 9 35 34 4 
Scenario 10 47 10 4 
Scenario 11 47 22 4 
Scenario 12 59 10 4 
Scenario 13 59 22 4 
Scenario 14 23 22 12 
 
 
Figure 2-6 The Locations of the Ignition Source 
 
In this section, the FDS code is used to conduct fire simulation for 14 credible 
scenarios.  
In order to obtain precise data at a specific point in the simulation, 66 
thermocouples are set in the target structure. These 66 thermocouples are 
distributed evenly over the target structure and can record the temperature of the 
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monitoring points changing over time. Figure 2-7 indicates the location of 66 
thermocouples. Additionally, 10 slices are selected and placed evenly on the X-
axis to show the concentration of gas fuel and temperature change over time in 
Smokeview. Figure 2-8 indicates the location of 10 slices. 
 
Figure 2-7 The Location of 66 Thermocouples 
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Figure 2-8 The Location of 10 Slices. 
 
In scenario 2, with the wind action, the fuel gas disperses rapidly and is exposed 
to the ignition source. At about 21s, the vapour gas is ignited when the fuel gas 
reaches the flammable limit and the temperature reaches the ignition temperature. 
Due to the existence of confined geometry around the ignition source in scenario 
2, the fire occurs, and the temperature rises rapidly after the fuel vapour is ignited. 
The flame rapidly returns to the leakage point and ignites all the fuel released from 
the vessel. The spill fire then forms until the leak stops. In this scenario, the longest 
time of all 14 scenarios is needed to ignite the vapour cloud, so the flame has the 
shortest duration and the period of the damage to the adjacent assets and structure 
is short. However, the highest maximum temperature of all 14 scenarios is found 
in scenario 2, which will be analyzed in detail in the next section. Figure 2-9 shows 
the contours of the fire change over time for scenario 2 in Smokeview. Six 
monitoring points are selected as examples of temperature change over time for 
scenario 2, as shown in Figure 2-10. Note that for most monitoring points, the 
temperature reaches a peak after the 30s, indicating a very high rate of temperature 
rise, giving less time for safe mustering.  
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(a)  24.7s 
 
(b)  34.5s 
 
(c)  50.0s 
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Figure 2-9 The Contours of the Fire Over Time for Scenario 2 
 
 
Figure 2-10 Temperatures Recorded at 6 Monitoring Points  
 
Figure 2-11 shows the maximum temperature that a fire could cause in each 
scenario. According to the result, Scenario 2 has the highest temperature while 
Scenario 6 has the lowest. Apparently, the highest temperatures of Scenarios 3, 6, 
9 and 14 have different degrees of reduction, which indicates that due to the 
existence of some structures between the location of the ignition source and the 
leakage point, the gas fuel may not spread far and thus the fire will not cause as 
serious a result as others within the simulation period. 
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Figure 2-11 The Maximum Temperature in Each Scenario 
 
As shown in Figure 2-12, some thermocouples are selected in Scenario 11 to 
indicate the difference between 538℃  and the temperature recorded at some 
monitoring points. This is highlighted in Figure 2-12, which shows the period of 
dangerous temperature rise. The duration of the dangerous temperature caused by 
a fire is monitored by measuring points and plotted in Figure 2-11. Analysis of the 
results of all credible scenarios shows that scenario 11 has the maximum time 
duration of a dangerous temperature, while scenario 6 has the minimal time 
duration of a dangerous temperature. It can be concluded that due to the close 
distance and a scarcity of other structures between the location of the ignition 
source and the leakage point in Scenario 11, the fire could occur more easily than 
in other scenarios, so a fire caused by a close ignition source could last for a long 
time. 
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Figure 2-12 Temperatures Recorded in Some Monitoring Points in Scenario 11 
 
The size of the dangerous zone can be shown using a slice file that is perpendicular 
to the Z-axis. Figure 2-13 shows the slice file of the temperature in scenario 13. 
Of all credible scenarios, scenario 2 can cause the largest dangerous zone. A long 
period before ignition gives gas fuel the opportunity to disperse further, which 
leads to it being the largest dangerous zone.  
 
Figure 2-13 Slice File of Temperatures in Scenario 13 
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For the leakage occurring in a specific tank, the location of the ignition source 
affects the result of the fire. To sum up, based on the fire analysis of all credible 
scenarios in this case, considering the aforementioned three aspects that measure 
the impact of fire, Scenarios 2, 11 and 13 are considered the three most dangerous 
scenarios overall in terms of thermal effect. 
Considering the confined layout of an FLNG, transition from fire to explosion may 
possibly occur. In this study, FLACS, a CFD software used extensively for 
explosion modelling, was used to simulate a possible explosion occurring under 
the same conditions. Since this study mainly focuses on the fire’s effect on an 
offshore facility, the explosion simulation result is presented briefly. The ignition 
location is selected based on the release and dispersion simulation results achieved 
through FLACS. Figure 2-14 shows the pressure caused by the explosion changing 
over time in the FLACS simulation. According to the results, ignition occurred at 
about 30s. Overpressure caused by the explosion is not high enough to cause 
damage to assets in this case and thus, thermal radiation is considered to be the 
main impact in this study. 
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Figure 2-14 Pressure changes over time in FLACS simulation 
 
2.3.4 Step 4: Fire Suppression Simulation and Analysis 
In this section, a firewall and an auto fire suppression system are installed in the 
FLNG facility and then a CFD simulation is conducted with the same parameters 
as are used in the previous sections. 
The deluge system is simulated using the FDS code with Lagrangian particles. 
Sprinkler heads with a 12 m2 coverage area is installed and the distance between 
the sprinkler heads is set to be 4.5 m, according to the NFPA 13 standard [64]. 
When the sprinkler heads are exposed to fire and the temperature around them 
reaches 60 degrees Celsius, they will be activated automatically[12].  
 
Figure 2-15 shows the maximum temperature at which the fire can reach the target 
structure in the absence of any safety measures and the maximum temperature at 
which the fire can reach the target structure under the protection of a firewall and 
42 
 
fire suppression system in the three most dangerous scenarios. Obviously, due to 
the existence of a firewall and fire suppression system, the maximum temperature 
of all scenarios is decreased in varying degrees. In Scenario 2, the firewall is very 
helpful because it can prevent the spreading of fuel and the fire. Since Scenario 2 
has the longest distance from the leakage point to the ignition source, preventing 
the spreading of fuel can highly decrease the opportunity for natural gas to meet 
the ignition source and thus highly decrease the impact of a fire. However, in the 
other two scenarios, the fire suppression system plays a more vital role in 
mitigating the effects of the fire in terms of maximum temperature the fire can 
cause. In Scenarios 11 and 13, the distances between the leakage points and 
ignition sources are very short so the natural gas is still very likely to meet the 
ignition sources, in spite of the existence of a firewall. Therefore, the fire 
suppression system can be a more effective way to mitigate the impact of fire in 
this case. 
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Figure 2-15 Maximum Temperature the Fire Caused Before and After 
Application of Safety Measures 
 
The following figures take Scenarios 2 and 13 as examples to show the 
effectiveness of safety measures. 
In Figures 2-16 and 2-17, 4 monitoring points are selected to show the temperature 
changes over time in Scenarios 2 and 13. In each scenario, the figures show the 
results both before and after the application of safety measures. In this section, the 
dangerous temperature line is set to show the difference between the dangerous 
temperature and the temperature caused by fire. The part that exceeds the 
dangerous temperature has been highlighted in the figures; thus, the duration of a 
dangerous temperature can be explicitly demonstrated.  
According to the results shown in Figures 2-16 and 2-17, both the firewall and the 
fire suppression system can effectively mitigate the impact of fire on varying 
degrees in terms of the duration of a dangerous temperature. For scenario 2, the 
firewall plays a more vital role than the fire suppression system. Compared to the 
scenario without applying safety measures, it is obvious that in scenario 2, ignition 
is delayed at some specific monitoring points such as points 13 and 39 due to the 
existence of a firewall. For scenario 13, the firewall is ineffective to delay ignition 
because of the short distance between the leakage point and ignition source. 
However, the FLNG avoids a more serious impact of fire with the help of the fire 
suppression system. 
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In Figure 2-18 and 2-19, slice files are used to show the temperature of the cross-
section perpendicular to the Z-axis and the slice plane and the largest size of the 
dangerous zone is recorded in each scenario. In scenario 2, the firewall is not very 
useful to prevent the spreading of fire, but it effectively reduces the high 
temperature. The insignificant opportunity for natural gas to meet the ignition gas 
contributes to this result. A small amount of natural gas meeting an ignition source 
brings a comparatively low temperature, but the firewall cannot effectively reduce 
the size of a fire when the fire has already started. In scenario 13, due to the 
existence of a firewall, the spread of fuel gas and flames is highly suppressed. 
Therefore, the high temperature mainly concentrates within the firewall and for 
this reason, the dangerous zone can be reduced. However, the area within the 
firewall has a comparatively higher temperature. Although a fire suppression 
system cannot influence the spread of fuel gas and flames, it can reduce the size 
of a dangerous zone by reducing the overall temperature in the FLNG. The results 
in this section further demonstrate that for different scenarios, the effectiveness of 
the safety measure varies. 
In summary, both firewalls and auto fire suppression systems can effectively 
mitigate the impact of fire in terms of the maximum temperature the fire can cause, 
the duration of the dangerous temperature and the size of the dangerous zone. 
However, for different scenarios, these two safety measures have different 
effectiveness. For a scenario in which the ignition source is far from the leakage 
point, the firewall can effectively prevent the spread of natural gas and thus reduce 
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its opportunity to meet the ignition source. For a scenario in which the ignition 
source is close to the leakage point, such as in Scenarios 11 and 13, the firewall 
cannot delay the occurrence of fire but it can limit most of the fire to inside the 
firewall, and thus effectively reduce the size of the dangerous area. However, 
introducing a firewall will increase the confinement of the FLNG layout. This may 
increase the chance of an explosion. An auto fire suppression system can reduce 
the flammable gas concentration and reduce the heat through vaporization and thus 
effectively mitigate the impact of a fire. 
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(a) Without Safety Measures 
 
(b) Firewall 
 
(c) Fire Suppression System 
 
Figure 2-16 Temperatures Recorded at Some Monitoring Points Before and 
After Application of Safety Measures in Scenario 2 
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(a) Without Safety Measures 
 
(b) Firewall 
 
(c) Fire Suppression System 
 
Figure 2-17 Temperature Recorded at Some Monitoring Points Before and After 
Application of Safety Measures in Scenario 13 
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(a) Without Safety Measures  
 
(b) Firewall  
 
(c) Fire Suppression System  
 
Figure 2-18 Slice File of Temperatures in Scenario 2
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(a) Without Safety Measures 
 
(b) Firewall 
 
(c) Fire Suppression System 
 
Figure 2-19 Slice File of Temperatures in Scenario 13 
 
50 
 
2.4 Conclusions 
This paper proposes a procedure for analyzing the effectiveness of safety measures 
in reducing the impact of fire caused by an LNG release in an FLNG facility, 
considering the impact of the ignition source location.  
The fire simulations are conducted for credible scenarios with different ignition 
source locations and the results extracted to determine the most dangerous 
scenarios. In this study, three aspects are considered to model the impact of 
accident scenarios. They are the maximum temperature the fire can cause, the 
duration of the dangerous temperature and the size of the dangerous zone. The 
results of the study confirm that the release of LNG is a serious threat to personnel 
on board and the assets. The relatively small differences in ignition source 
locations can increase the effect of the consequences of a fire. 
To mitigate the impact of fire, a firewall and fire suppression system are selected 
and implemented. FDS is used as a tool to analyze the impact of each scenario 
with different ignition source locations after applying safety measures. Comparing 
the results before and after applying safety measures, it can be concluded that 
safety measures such as firewalls and auto fire suppression help to limit the impact 
of fire; however, the threat still remains significant. Using the proper layout to 
isolate the danger is identified as most effective in terms of limiting the impact of 
potential accidents. 
This study emphasizes that an FLNG layout must be considered with the utmost 
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care. This step is the most effective measure in limiting a potential LNG release 
and subsequent dispersion effect, and directly influences the fire dynamics and 
thus limits the potential damage.  
The scope of this study is limited to fire safety analysis through a numerical 
simulation approach. The transition from fire to an explosion will be studied in 
future work. The proposed approach will be further validated through a control 
experiment (field) data reported in the literature.  
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Chapter 3. A Time-Dependent Probabilistic Model for Fire Accident 
Analysis1 
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Abstract 
Fire is among the most common and devastating accidents in the hydrocarbon 
production and processing industry. Many efforts have been dedicated to assessing 
fire accident likelihood; however, most of these studies considered fire probability 
 
 
1 Yang, R., Khan, F., Taleb-Berrouane, M., & Kong, D. A Time-Dependent Probabilistic Model for Fire 
Accident Analysis. Submitted to Fire Safety Journal 
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as spatially distributed, ignoring the time dependence of the fire accident scenario. 
In this study, a robust and practical model is proposed to analyze fire accident 
probability in a congested and complex processing area. This model integrates a 
conditional probability approach – the Bayesian network (BN) - with a time-
dependent scenario evolution approach, Stochastic Petri Nets (SPN). The 
computational fluid dynamics (CFD) tool is used to estimate the time-dependent 
scenario consequences. The outcome of the model is fire probability as a function 
of time and location caused by a specific leak rate and leak duration. A case study 
of fire probability analysis in a Floating Liquified Natural Gas facility (FLNG) is 
presented. This study demonstrates the importance of the temporal dependency of 
the fire scenario and the proposed model can serve as the required tool for time-
dependent fire probability analysis, further safety measures’ application and 
system optimization. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Fire accidents caused by hydrocarbon leakage are extremely hazardous in 
hydrocarbon processing and handling facilities. Moreover, due to the complex and 
congested layout of oil and gas facilities, a fire has a high damage potential for 
humans and assets [65]. Fire and explosion accidents which occurred in the last 
decades such as the Piper Alpha disaster[66], Buncefield oil depot fire accident 
[4], the BP Texas City disaster [3], the BP Deepwater Horizon explosion [20] and 
the Cleveland explosion [39] have already highlighted the importance of focusing 
on fire and explosion accidents.  
Numerous studies have been conducted to analyze the fire accidents caused by 
hydrocarbon leakage. A series of studies conducted by Baalisampang et al. used a 
Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) code to model fire accidents occurring on a 
typical floating liquified natural gas processing facility (FLNG) and their effects 
on personnel and assets. In these studies, the effectiveness of a water deluge 
system’s ability to mitigate the fire impact was verified, and the Probit method 
was combined with a Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) code to determine the 
fire’s effects. According to the results, improved layout design and passive control 
strategies are necessary, and inherently safe layout design is then determined [12-
14]. Yang et al. used FDS to simulate the hydrocarbon leakage and fire accidents 
caused by ignition sources at different locations. The fires’ impacts on structures 
and humans on the topside were assessed, and the effectiveness of safety measures 
was analyzed in this study [8]. The method of BORA-Release proposed by Aven 
et al. analyzed the ability of safety barriers to prevent hydrocarbon leakage, as well 
as other influencing factors, such as the platform’s technical conditions, human 
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factors and operational and organizational risks affecting barrier performance [67]. 
To assess the risk of a fire accident, it is important to accurately determine its 
occurrence probability. In the current oil and gas industry, the following methods 
are commonly used to analyze the likelihood of a fire accident [68]: 
- Historical accident frequency data 
- Fault tree analysis 
- Theoretical modelling 
- Event tree analysis (ETA) 
- Human reliability analysis 
- Expert judgement 
- Bayesian analysis 
In the study conducted by Paik et al., the fire probability is calculated by Equation 
(3.1) [69]. In this study, the leak frequency is calculated by combining historical 
data and simulation, considering the leak amount, while the ignition probability is 
obtained with historical data.  
  (3.1) 
In the research by Lee et al., two types of LNG supply systems are assessed in 
terms of their fire accident risk. The fire probability is assessed using an ETA [70]. 
The failure probability of each safety barrier is estimated from historical data, 
while the ignition probability after leakage is determined by Equation (3.2) [71]. 
 P = 0.017m0.74 (3.2) 
where m is the mass flow rate of the gaseous fuel, kg/s. 
Zhu et al. explored several studies on ignition probability given a leakage accident. 
Some previous studies and reports proposed methods to calculate the ignition 
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probability based on mass flow rate [68]. For example, Cox et al. proposed a 
simplified equation for continuous instead of instantaneous releases, while 
coefficients a and b are estimated for different scenarios, as shown in Equation 
(3.3) [72]. In addition, Equation (3.4) is used to estimate the ignition probabilty 
for gas release with delayed ignition [73]. 
 P = amb (3.3) 
where m is the mass flow rate, kg/s. 
 P = (e−4.16m0.642) × (e−2.995m0.38) (3.4) 
where m is the mass flow rate, kg/s.  
 
Wang et al. used the Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN) to predict the occurrence 
probability of fire on an offshore platform considering the effects of the human 
factor. In this study, the fire probability is considered to be the combination of the 
probability of an ignition source and hydrocarbon leakage. The other factors may 
be explained by the conditional probability table (CPT) but are not mentioned in 
the text. The results showed that the hot surfaces of equipment, waste gas, torch 
flames, and static sparks contribute the most to fire and explosion in oil and gas 
processing units [74]. Bilal et al. analyzed the risk of fire and explosion accidents 
in the pipelines using BN and Bow tie [75]. The theory of fuzzy sets is applied to 
consider the uncertainty due to impression. This work provides good view of the 
accident and calculate the occurrence probability. However, the dynamics feature 
of the accident is ignored in this work. 
 
A fire accident can be viewed as a process in which the time dependency is an 
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essential feature. However, most of the studies mentioned above have considered 
fire probability as spatially distributed, ignoring the time dependence of the fire 
accident scenario. Techniques such as DBN are good at modeling the relationships 
among variables using CPT [76-78], and these tools have the ability to simulate 
time-dependent feature to some extent. For example, they can capture the 
probability in different time slices; however, they fail to capture the feature 
between time intervals. The SPN model enables capturing the time-dependent 
feature [79]; however, its ability to capture causal relationships between variables 
is not as strong as that of BN, especially the ability to capture the conditional 
relationships. In a fire modeling, BN can be used to model leakage probability as 
it provides an outcome of a complex interaction of parameters, while ignition 
probability is a time-dependent and random process, which is best modeled by 
SPN. Therefore, the integration of SPN and BN provides a robust method to 
capture the causal relationship between variables and time-dependent features. In 
addition, the CFD model serves as an accurate technique to incorporate all on-site 
variables and is also a good tool for viewing the value of a variable of interest over 
time in transient modeling. Taking the time dependence and factor dependence of 
the fire accident scenario into consideration through the combination of BN, SPN 
and CFD models, the present paper proposes a robust and practical model to 
analyze the fire accident probability in a congested and complex processing area, 
such as an offshore vessel, as a time-dependent process, which is lacking in the 
currently existing models. The present study aims to overcome existing models’ 
shortcomings as described above by proposing a time-dependent probabilistic 
model for fire accident analysis. 
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An FLNG is an offshore facility designed to employ various LNG development 
technologies, including gas extraction, gas pre-treatment, natural gas liquefaction, 
condensate treatment, water treatment, LNG storage, and LNG offloading [18]. 
The FLNG is very congested with complex layouts. Because of its limited area, 
the FLNG has a substantial risk of fire accidents. The previous work by Yang et 
al. demonstrates how the fire accident can damage the structure and humans on 
the topside [8]. Therefore, it is necessary to determine the fire accident probability 
in the congested and complex processing area in an FLNG. To demonstrate the 
application of the proposed methodology, the probability assessment of a fire 
accident occurring in an FLNG is conducted as a case study in this research. 
 
3.2 Proposed Methodology 
Three core factors that cause a fire accident are hydrocarbon leakage, the 
concentration being within the flammable limit and ignition. These three elements 
need to coexist to cause a fire. Thus, the fire probability can be represented by 
Equation (3.5). 
 P(f) = P(I, L, C) (3.1)  
where, 
 is the probability that all three causation factors, including hydrocarbon 
leakage, the concentration being within the flammable limit, and ignition, occur 
simultaneously. 
Based on the conditional probability theory [80], the fire occurrence probability 
equation can be further developed and defined in Equation (3.6). 
 P(f) = P(I, L, C) = P(L) × P(C|L) × P(I|L, C) (3.2)  
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where, 
 is the occurrence probability of a hydrocarbon leakage; 
 is the probability of the concentration being within the flammable limits, 
given a hydrocarbon leakage; 
 is the ignition probability given a hydrocarbon leakage as well as the 
concentration being within flammable limits. 
In this study, Equation (3.2) is used to calculate the occurrence probability of a 
hydrocarbon fire accident. Three terms in Equation (3.2) are modeled using 
advanced methods. The occurrence probability of a hydrocarbon leakage, , 
is modeled using the BN model, the probability of the concentration being within 
the flammable limits given a hydrocarbon leakage, , is obtained through 
applying CFD simulation, and the ignition probability, given a hydrocarbon 
leakage as well as the concentration being within flammable limits, , is 
modeled through the leakage duration simulation using SPN, with the assumption 
that an ignition source always exists. As shown in Figure 3-1, the proposed 
methodology in this study comprises five main steps: i) assessment of the leakage 
probability using a BN model, ii) assessment of the ignition probability using an 
SPN model, iii) assessment of the flammable vapour cloud probability using a 
CFD model, iv) probability assessment of a fire accident and v) optimization of 
system configuration to minimize fire scenario probability. Detailed steps of the 
simulation section are presented in Section 3.2.1-3.2.4. 
The assumptions made in the proposed methodology include: (1) the proposed 
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methodology considers conditional probability theory, comprised of three factors, 
as the cause of the fire accident; (2) probability of a hydrocarbon leakage is 
calculated by BN, considering that all its non-descendant variables in the network 
are conditionally independent; (3) probability of ignition is calculated using PN 
and Monte Carlo simulation, considering variables following lognormal 
distribution; (4) the parameters and assumptions made in the case study are listed 
in the case study section. 
Ignition probability,  
P(I|L,C):
using SPN
Flammable vapour 
cloud probability, 
P(C|L): using CFD
Leak probability, 
P(L): using BN 
 P(f) = P(I,L,C) = P(L) × P(C|L) × P(I|L,C)
System 
optimization
No
Is fire 
probability 
acceptable?
Generate the 
report
Yes
Identify potential 
leak sources
Consider specific 
leakage rate
Fire probability
 
Figure 3-1 Flow chart of the proposed methodology. 
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3.2.1 Assessment of leakage probability 
A leak is a starting point of a fire accident scenario. The leak sources and the 
probability of hydrocarbon leakage, , are modeled and determined using the 
BN model. 
BN, also called a belief network, is a powerful tool for probabilistic modeling 
having uncertainty, using a directed acyclic graph and CPTs. In a BN, nodes 
represent variables, and directed arcs are used to represent the causal relationships 
between the variables [81]. Probabilistic analysis using BN is based on the 
conditional relationships among variables and d-separation. The joint probability 
distribution P of the random variables in some sets, , can 
be represented in Equation (3.3) [82]. 
 P = ∏ P(Xi|Pa(Xi))
n
i=1  (3.3) 
where  represents the parent of the variable . 
 
The object-oriented Bayesian network (OOBN) simplifies the graphical interface 
of complex BN structures [83]. It provides a concise way to present the framework 
of the BN using sub-networks. In addition to the usual nodes in a typical BN, 
instance nodes are used in the OOBN to represent the sub-networks. This allows 
a hierarchical structure for better understanding [84]. In the proposed model, 
OOBN is applied when the typical BN model is too complex to clearly represent 
the present model. 
3.2.2 Assessment of ignition probability 
As described in the methodology section, the ignition probability, given a 
hydrocarbon leak as well as the concentration being within flammable limits, 
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, is modeled through a leakage duration simulation using SPN, with the 
assumption that an ignition source always exists. Given that the concentration is 
within flammable limits, the ignition probability is related to the leakage scenario 
with specific parameters. By determining a specific leakage scenario, the 
corresponding ignition probability can be determined.  
In a hydrocarbon leakage scenario, leak rate and duration are two important 
parameters. While a leak rate can be easily modeled using analytical and empirical 
methods, the duration of a leak remains challenging to model. The ignition 
probability increases with the duration of a leak. Many previous works assume this 
value in their release and dispersion simulations[8, 12]; however, this value needs 
to be accurately determined, considering its significant influence on the probability 
assessment of the fire accident. In this step, the leak duration is modeled and 
analyzed using SPN, due to its ability to perform process modeling and time-
dependent probability modeling. 
Petri nets, which were developed in the early 1960s by Carl Adam Petri, are widely 
used in representing the workflow process. A PN is a directed graph, in which the 
place is used to represent a certain state of the system, and the transition between 
two places is used to represent the state change from one place to another. To 
conduct the probability analysis, the traditional Petri net needs to be extended; 
firing rates of a transition are necessary. The SPN can overcome this limitation by 
introducing λ as the firing rate associated with transitions [85]. 
In this step, the initial state is defined as the leakage occurrence, and the final state 
is defined as the stopped leakage. In reality, the release can be stopped either by 
the control system or by the exhaustion of inventory. Thus, the release duration is 
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less than or equal to the time of the depletion of relevant inventory. In the present 
study, it is recommended to consider the maximum duration of release, to be on 
the conservative side. Therefore, this effect is analyzed in the case study by 
considering several leak inspection and maintenance parameters. Two principal 
factors that contribute to the leakage duration, the time to detect the hydrocarbon 
gas and the time to determine the leak point, are considered and assumed to follow 
a probability distribution over time. Accordingly, the probability distribution of 
the leakage duration can be obtained by measuring the time duration from the 
initial state to the final state using Monte-Carlo simulation, and then the ignition 
probability can be determined. 
 
3.2.3 Assessment of flammable vapour cloud probability 
This step focuses on hydrocarbon dispersion, which leads to the formation of a 
flammable cloud. The flammable cloud is the region that has hydrocarbon within 
flammable limits. The flammable cloud is the reactive area and thus controls the 
probability of a fire accident. In this study, FLACS is used to model the 
hydrocarbon release and dispersion consequences. FLACS, which relies on 
turbulence models based on Reynolds-averaged Navier-Stokes (RANS) equations, 
is an advanced CFD simulation software specially designed for dispersion, fire and 
explosion modeling. It has been tested and validated using the field and 
experimental data in previous studies and has proven to be a reliable tool for 
modeling gas dispersion [86, 87]. Using a 3-D Cartesian grid, the mass, 
momentum, turbulent kinetic energy, mass-fraction of fuel and mixture-fraction 
are solved using a finite volume method in FLACS. To better represent complex 
geometries on a coarse grid, FLACS uses a distributed porosity concept for small 
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objects, which need to be represented by a sub-grid [88]. Therefore, sub-grid 
objects, which may be ignored by other CFD software, can contribute to the 
simulation results in the FLACS. 
The leakage duration with different occurrence probabilities obtained in the 
previous step is used as a simulation parameter in this step. The vapour cloud 
caused by the hydrocarbon leakage with a specific leakage duration can be 
obtained, and therefore, the flammable area can be determined through CFD 
modeling. As a result, the flammable cloud volume, , over time and the net 
volume of the simulation area, , are extracted. These two values are used to 
calculate the probability of the concentration being within the flammable limits, 
given a hydrocarbon leakage . In the current study, the probability of the 
concentration being within the flammable limits given a hydrocarbon leakage 
 is calculated using , which is a time-dependent value, with the 
change of the flammable cloud volume over time, . This ratio accounts for the 
fact that when the cloud in the entire area is within the flammable limit, the 
probability of the concentration being within the flammable limits given a 
hydrocarbon leakage is equal to one, while, when no cloud is within the flammable 
limit, the probability is equal to zero. 
 
3.2.4 System configuration optimization to minimize fire probability  
Given the fire accident probability of a system, a system can be optimized to 
reduce the fire occurrence probability and therefore, the fire accident risk. In the 
oil and gas industry, system optimizations such as fire protection system 
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installation, layout optimization, and leak detection system improvement can be 
applied according to the specific conditions. The results obtained from the new 
system are compared to the probability from the original system. The optimal 
design can then be determined using the proposed approach.  
 
3.3 Case study 
In this study, the probability of a fire accident occurring in an FLNG is modeled 
as a case study using the proposed methodology. 
An FLNG is comprised of a life module, central control room, processing unit, 
hull and ship systems, a turret and fluid transmission control rotary joint and 
mooring and riser systems. Among them, the processing unit is considered to be 
the most hazardous area [41]. In this study, the proposed approach is applied to 
assess the probability of fire occurrence in the processing unit of an FLNG. 
3.3.1 Assessment of leakage probability 
Considering the essential conditions of a fire existing in the processing unit of an 
FLNG, the hydrocarbon leakage is analyzed in this section using BN. Table 3-1 
shows the probability of each basic node according to OREDA [89] and the studies 
by Wang et al. and Yang et al. [90, 91]. Given the failure rate of the component in 
OREDA, the failure probability is calculated by assuming that every component 
follows a constant failure rate within 15 years. Also, probabilities of other nodes 
are obtained directly from the studies by Wang et al. and Yang et al.. The 
relationships among events are represented in the form of CPTs, which are 
determined based on expert knowledge of the subject (Experts in this study include 
Dr. Faisal Khan, who is the Canada Research Chair (Tier I) of Offshore Safety and 
Risk Engineering, Dr. Mohammed Taleb-Berrouane, who works in safety and risk 
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area for many years). In this study, BNs are developed using Hugin Software 
version 8.6 (http://www.hugin.com) [92]. Detailed BNs are presented in Figures 
3-2 to 3-8. 
Table 3-1 Probability of basic nodes [89-91] 
Basic Node State Probability  
Process equipment leakage   
Failure of LSV yes 0.0032 
Failure of FCV yes 0.0885 
Excessive flow yes 0.0064 
High pressure yes 0.0060 
Failure of the pressure relief valve yes 0.1088 
Failure of PCV yes 0.0885 
  
 
Junction leakage   
Faulty installation yes 0.0045 
   
Corrosion  
 
Condition induced factors yes 0.01 
Corrosive fluid yes 0.0149 
High surface conductivity yes 0.1 
Coating damaged yes 0.0077 
Welding defects yes 0.01 
Aging yes 0.0024 
Poor corrosion management yes 0.02 
   
External damage   
External weather yes 0.002 
Object collision yes 0.0001 
Damage of insulation coating yes 0.062 
Delayed maintenance yes 0.0017 
   
Equipment displacement   
Loose junction bolts yes 0.1263 
Seismic activity yes 0.02 
Excessive vibration yes 0.1383 
 
For the probability assessment of a hydrocarbon leakage, the OOBN is applied in 
this study, with its ability to divide the system into sub-networks. Figures 3-2 
presents the overall OOBN framework of the hydrocarbon leakage in the studied 
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area. A leak can be expected to occur in the process equipment, at the junction or 
on the pipeline, and any one of those scenarios has the potential to cause a fire 
accident. In the network, this fact is indicated by the arrows from the nodes of 
these scenarios to the node of hydrocarbon leakage. Detailed analyses of these 
three scenarios are demonstrated as sub-networks in Figures 3-3, 3-4, and 3-5. 
Among various influencing factors, some events can cause more than one failure 
scenario to occur, which is known as common cause failure (CCF). In the current 
study, corrosion, equipment displacement, and external damage are considered 
and analyzed as CCF, contributing to each leakage scenario. The nodes with a 
dotted border represent the CCFs that are considered in each scenario. In addition, 
arrows from CCF nodes to each scenario indicate their causal relationship. To 
reduce the complexity of the whole network, detailed CCF analysis is represented 
as individual sub-networks, which are shown in Figures 3-6, 3-7, and 3-8. 
 
Figure 3-2 The overall OOBN of the hydrocarbon leakage in the studied area. 
 
Figure 3-3 depicts the sub-network of the process equipment leakage in the studied 
area. In this model, overpressure inside the equipment as well as three CCFs, 
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including corrosion, equipment displacement, and external damage, are considered 
to be the critical influencing factors, and detailed analysis of CCFs are presented 
subsequently. In process equipment, overpressure can be caused by uncontrolled 
liquid flow or high-pressure gas. Uncontrolled flow occurs when the control valve 
fails and excessive flow occurs, and both LSV and FCV may cause the failure of 
the flow control. In addition, extremely high pressure of the gas is caused by the 
simultaneous occurrence of high pressure and pressure control failure, where the 
failure of the PCV and the pressure relief valve are two main issues leading to the 
pressure control failure. Figure 3-4 and Figure 3-5 outline the sub-networks of the 
pipeline leakage and the junction leakage. As shown in the network, two CCFs, 
including external damage and corrosion, are considered in the pipeline leakage in 
this study. For the junction leakage, as well as the three CCFs, faulty installation 
is considered to be another factor causing the failure.  
To connect each sub-network to the overall OOBN, three leakage scenarios in the 
sub-networks, which are marked by a gray solid border, are set as output nodes 
affecting the overall OOBN of the hydrocarbon leakage.  
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Figure 3-3 OOBN sub-network of the process equipment leakage. 
 
 
Figure 3-4 OOBN sub-network of the pipeline leakage 
 
  
Figure 3-5 OOBN sub-network of the junction leakage 
 
As CCFs, corrosion, equipment displacement and external damage are modeled 
and demonstrated separately in the current study, as shown in Figure 3-6 to Figure 
3-8. In the corrosion sub-network, three principal causal factors, including fluid 
factors, surface factors, and asset integrity factors, are considered, as shown in 
Figure 3-6. Most of the principal causal factors of corrosion are listed and analyzed 
in this section. In the sub-network of external damage, the combination of third-
party damage and poor maintenance practices contributes to the external damage 
of each leakage scenario. In addition, equipment displacement is another CCF 
contributing to each leakage scenario, as shown in Figure 3-8. Similarly, gray solid 
borders are marked as output nodes contributing to higher level nodes. 
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Given the networks shown in Figure 3-2 to Figure 3-8 and the probability of each 
node, shown in Table 3-1, the results of the OOBN model can be calculated using 
Hugin Software. The results of CCFs, each leakage scenario, and hydrocarbon 
leakage are presented in Table 3-2. According to the simulation result, the 
probability of the hydrocarbon leakage in the studied area, , is estimated to be 
0.1101. In addition, among three leakage scenarios, the probability of pipeline 
leakage is lowest while the probability of junction leakage is highest. Since any of 
three scenarios’ occurrence can cause a hydrocarbon leakage, it can be concluded 
from the results that junction leakage contributes the most to the hydrocarbon 
leakage, while process equipment contributes the least. 
 
  
Figure 3-6 OOBN sub-network of the corrosion 
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Figure 3-7 OOBN sub-network of the external damage 
 
   
Figure 3-8 OOBN sub-network of the equipment displacement 
 
Table 3-2 Results of the BN 
Parameter Probability 
Process equipment leakage 0.0468 
Pipeline leakage 0.0348 
Junction leakage 0.059 
Corrosion 0.0644 
External damage 0.0183 
Equipment displacement 0.0584 
Hydrocarbon leakage 0.1101 
 
3.3.2 Assessment of ignition probability 
In this step, the SPN model is used to model the leakage control and extract the 
leakage duration for release modeling. Figure 3-9 presents the SPN model of the 
leakage duration, which is developed using GRIF software. As described in the 
methodology section, the leakage is assumed to have stopped before the inventory 
depletion, and the duration is analyzed by considering several leak inspection and 
maintenance parameters in the case study. After leakage occurs, the release 
detector system in the FLNG can detect the fuel vapour within a period of time. 
The total response time of a detector system depends not only on the time taken 
for the dispersed gas to reach the detector, but also the time for a sensor to respond 
and the response time of the processing signal [93]. In this study, the total response 
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time of the gas detector system is assumed to follow a lognormal distribution with 
an average time of 10 seconds and an error factor of 3. To entirely control the 
hydrocarbon leakage, the leak point needs to be determined for further application 
of the safety measure. It is assumed that the duration of each diagnosis of leak 
point identification follows a lognormal distribution with an average time of 20 
seconds and an error factor of 3. In addition, the probability of each diagnosis can 
successfully identify the leak point, which is assumed to be 0.9. If the previous 
diagnosis fails to determine the leak point, another diagnosis is needed. Once the 
leak point is determined, some actions such as shutting down the sub-system 
would be applied to stop the leakage. The lognormal distribution with an average 
time of 20 seconds and an error factor of 3 is used to model the leakage control 
after successful leak point identification in this study.  
Table  3-3 shows the parameters in the PN and their values. 
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Figure 3-9 SPN model of the hydrocarbon leakage duration 
 
Table 3-3 Parameters of the SPN model 
Parameter 
Values  
Distribution Average Error factor 
Detection success Lognormal 10 3 
Diagnosis success Lognormal  20 3 
Control success Lognormal  20 3 
 
Leakage duration can be obtained through applying Monte Carlo simulation with 
GRIF software. In this study, the total simulation time is 150 seconds, with steps 
of 0.036 seconds. The cumulative probability distribution (CDF) of the 
hydrocarbon leakage duration is presented in Figure 3-10. Given a specific leak 
duration, the maximum probability of the fuel being ignited can be determined. 
With an assumption that an ignition source always exists, the ignition probability 
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given a hydrocarbon leakage as well as the concentration being within the 
flammable limit, , is low for a lower leakage duration, while the ignition 
probability is high for a higher leakage duration. 
As shown in Figure 3-10, the results demonstrate that the leakage duration 
typically varies between 20 and 120 seconds. The probability of a leakage duration 
of less than 50 seconds is 55 percent, and after 100 seconds, the probability is 0.95, 
which is high enough to conclude that most hydrocarbon leakages can be 
controlled within this time. Probability growth rate, which can be measured by the 
slope of the curve, increases from 20 seconds and peaks at approximately 40 to 60 
seconds, and then decreases until the probability reaches 1. 
Considering the leakage duration probability and the growth rate of probability 
obtained from the result, leakage durations of 50 seconds, 75 seconds and 100 
seconds are selected and used as examples in the fuel release and dispersion 
simulation. The probabilities corresponding to these leakage durations are 0.55, 
0.85, and 0.95, respectively. 
 
Figure 3-10 Probability of the leakage duration obtained in SPN. 
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3.3.3 Assessment of flammable vapour cloud probability 
In this study, FLACS is used to simulate the result of the hydrocarbon release and 
dispersion, considering a specific leak rate and leak duration. The geometry of the 
target structure, as shown in Figure 3-11, is constructed using Auto CAD software. 
The detailed information is extracted from a typical FLNG processing facility. 
Considering the high risk, the fuel release and dispersion simulation in this study 
only focuses on the processing unit of the FLNG, as shown in Figure 3-12. Walls 
with holes around the processing unit are used to model the confinement around 
the studied area.   
 
Figure 3-11 3D model of the FLNG structure highlighting the processing unit. 
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Figure 3-12 The simulation area and the mesh used in the numerical simulation 
 
Considering the dilution process of the remaining fuel cloud after the leakage stops, 
the computation domain is set wide enough to cover the whole area that the vapour 
can reach. There are 324324 grid cells in total used in the computational domain. 
The mesh around the leak point is refined to prevent it from strong dilution [88], 
while the mesh outside the processing unit is stretched to balance the calculation 
time and the accuracy of the result, as shown in Figure 3-12. To guarantee that the 
simulation result is independent of the mesh size, a finer mesh as well as a coarse 
mesh have been used in sensitivity studies. In this study, a coarse mesh with 
258048 cells and a fine mesh with 360960 cells are selected. Figure 3-13 shows 
good correspondence between the simulation results of flammable cloud volume 
over time with different meshes, which proves that the current mesh is reliable for 
simulation. 
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Figure 3-13 Mesh sensitivity analysis result 
 
In the current study, the ambient pressure is set to be the atmospheric pressure, and 
the ambient temperature is set to be 20 degrees Celsius. The wind’s influence on 
fuel dispersion is also considered in this study. The speed of the wind is assumed 
to be 2m/s and the wind direction is assumed to be from +X direction. Considering 
the wind speed and the topography in the sea, the stability class is defined to be D, 
the ground roughness condition is assumed to be rural, and the ground roughness 
is defined to be 0.2, according to the works by Ekerold and Piblada et al. [11, 94]. 
A hydrocarbon leakage with a leak rate of 4kg/s and an outlet area of  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Coarse mesh, 30s  Coarse mesh, 50s 
 
 
 
 Mesh used in this study, 30s  Mesh used in this study, 50s 
 
 
 
 Fine mesh, 30s  Fine mesh, 50s 
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occurs in the processing unit. The leakage direction is set from +X direction. The 
leakage starts at 20s after a steady wind field forms. As mentioned in the previous 
section, different leakage durations of 50 seconds, 75 seconds and 100 seconds are 
selected in this section. 
Figure 3-14 shows an example of the simulation result of the hydrocarbon release 
and dispersion. The areas in different colours in this figure represent the fuel 
concentration in volumes from 0.05 to 0.15, which is defined to be the approximate 
flammable limit of the LNG in this section, to demonstrate the flammable cloud 
area after hydrocarbon leakage. 
 
 
 
Figure 3-14 Illustration of the flammable cloud caused by the hydrocarbon 
leakage 
 
To capture the volume of the flammable cloud, a gas monitor region, with a size 
of 60m × 61m × 26.5m, is defined around the studied area in the current study. 
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The 3D illustration of the gas monitor region is demonstrated in Figure 3-15. The 
total net area inside the gas monitor region, , is . The volume of 
the fuel cloud at the flammable limit, calculated by the equivalence ratio (ER) 
between the lower flammable limit (LFL) and upper flammable limit (UFL), , 
for different leakage durations is shown in Figure 3-16. The flammable cloud 
volume increases rapidly after the leakage starts and then stabilizes at around 
. As the leakage continues, the volume of the flammable cloud continues 
to rise to approximately 46 seconds. This can be caused by the dilution process 
under the influence of the wind and the confinement of the studied area. The 
volume peaks at the time after the leakage is controlled, and then it returns to zero 
gradually under the influence of dilution. For hydrocarbon leaks with different 
leakage durations, the maximum volume of flammable cloud then reach and the 
time for the cloud to dilute back to a normal level varies widely. As the results 
show, longer leakage duration results in longer dilution time as well as greater 
flammable volumes. Both of these variables can lead to a much higher fire risk. 
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Figure 3-15 3D illustration of the gas monitor region in the FLNG 
 
 
Figure 3-16 The volume of the flammable cloud with different leak durations 
obtained by the numerical simulation 
 
3.3.4 Probability assessment of a fire accident using an integrated method 
The probability of a fire accident in the processing unit of an FLNG is calculated 
according to Equation (3.6) in the proposed methodology. Equation (3.6) can be 
further expanded to Equation (3.8) assuming that the probability of the 
concentration being within flammable limits given a leakage is represented by the 
flammable cloud volume and the net volume of the studied area.  
 P(f) = P(I, L, C) = P(L) × P(C|L) × P(I|L, C) = P(L) ×
Vi
Vw
× P(I|L, C) (3.8)  
The results obtained by applying Equation (3.8) are shown in Figure 3-17. In 
summary, the results show that the fire probability, given a specific leak duration 
and leak rate, varies greatly over time. With different leakage durations, the 
probability of a fire accident differs greatly. It can also be concluded that a high 
leakage duration leads to a significantly higher probability of fire than low leakage 
duration at a given time as well as a longer fire risk period. Therefore, trying to 
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decrease the leakage duration can be a very powerful approach to reduce the fire 
probability 
In addition, applying safety measures at different times may have different effects. 
With the help of this model, the best time for workers to apply safety measures 
after hydrocarbon leakage can be studied. The result demonstrates the necessity to 
identify the temporal dependency of the fire probability. Therefore, it is essential 
to assess the change of the fire probability over time and identify the dangerous 
period. System optimization can be applied based on the results of the assessment 
to reduce the fire probability in the event of a hydrocarbon leakage. 
 
Figure 3-17 The probability of a fire in the processing unit of an FLNG given a 
specific leak rate and duration 
 
3.3.5 System configuration optimization to minimize fire probability 
Once the fire probability profile is obtained, system optimization can be performed 
if the probability of fire is unacceptably high. Configuration and layout 
optimization provide a preventive approach and can inherently improve safety in 
terms of fire accidents [41]. In this case study, the system configuration 
optimization is applied as an example of system optimization to reduce the 
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probability of fire accidents. 
Dispersion and ignition are sensitive to the confinement and congestion levels. 
Confinement is defined by the presence of physical surfaces which can limit the 
expansion of the flame [95]. Under the same leak conditions, systems with 
different confinement and congestion levels have different risks of fire accidents. 
Previous experiments show that confinement is needed for flame acceleration, 
which can cause a further explosion [95]. 
In this study, four simplified configuration models considering different 
confinement and congestion levels are tested, as shown in Figure 3-18. In terms of 
confinement, the worst case of a hydrocarbon leakage is that the system is 
completely confined, with solid walls around the leak area, as shown in 
configuration 1 of Figure 3-18. In this case, leaking gas cannot be ventilated from 
the system. Thus, it is possible that the flammable cloud continues growing over 
time even if the leakage stops. In configuration 2, the walls around the structure 
are removed, and the system is completely open to the air. This configuration 
model is ideal for the chemical industry; however, this model cannot be practical 
for some facilities such as the FLNG where space is limited. Configurations 1 and 
2 are modeled in this study as benchmarks for current configuration and optimized 
configuration. Configuration 3 is the model that was formerly used as a case study. 
In this model, a semi-confined area is generated by the blocks around the system, 
which is used to simulate the complex layout of equipment and pipelines inside 
the FLNG processing unit. In this step, configuration model 4 is proposed to 
optimize the configuration used in the previous steps to decrease the probability 
of fire accidents. According to the definition of confinement mentioned above, 
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configuration 4 has the same confinement as configuration 3, but with a different 
layout. This layout accounts for the optimization of the configuration without 
reducing the number and size of components inside the unit, when the confinement 
level caused by the existing equipment is not decreased. However, the equipment 
in configuration 4 is not placed as decentralized as that in the layout in 
configuration 3. As shown in configuration 4, equipment in the unit is properly 
grouped together to some extent, which can provide leaking fuel a more reasonable 
escape space than in configuration 3.  
 
Figure 3-18 Models with different configurations 
 
In this study, the analysis has identified configuration 1 to be the worst case, with 
 
 
 
 Configuration 1: Completely confined  Configuration 2: Open to the air 
 
 
 
Configuration 3: Semi-confined A  Configuration 4: Semi-confined B 
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100s hydrocarbon leakage being simulated to demonstrate the influence of the high 
confinement. As shown in Figure 3-19, the volume of the flammable cloud 
increases quickly once the leak starts. Unlike the result shown in configuration 3, 
where the volume begins to decrease after the leak is stopped, the flammable 
volume in the system with configuration 1 continues to increase, even if the leak 
stops under the influence of the solid walls around the leak area and the dispersion 
process of the fuel. At approximately 280 seconds, the volume stops increasing 
and is maintained at a constant level, which is , till the end of the 
simulation. Regarding the duration of the fire risk, which can be roughly estimated 
by the duration of the existence of the flammable cloud, the totally confined system 
prevents the ventilation of leaking gas, resulting in a long-term existence of the 
flammable cloud, and thus a long-term risk of fire. Furthermore, the comparison 
between the system with configuration 1 (the worst case) and configuration 3 
shows that in the worst case, the volume of the flammable cloud can be nearly ten 
times that in configuration 3,which is the normal case. This fact further increases 
the fire risk in configuration 1.  
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Figure 3-19 The flammable cloud volume of systems with configurations 1 and 3 
 
To reduce the fire probability, an optimized configuration (configuration 4) is 
proposed in this study. Simulations of different configurations are conducted under 
the same leakage conditions to demonstrate a reduction in fire probability by 
applying an optimized configuration. As shown in Figure 3-20, the leakage occurs 
in the system with configuration 4, creating a much lower flammable volume 
compared with configuration 3. Without reducing the number and size of 
components inside the unit, the new design can greatly improve the ventilation of 
leaking gas. In addition, in terms of flammable cloud volume and the duration of 
the fire risk, the system with configuration 4 has almost the same value as the 
system applying configuration 2, which is an ideal configuration for the chemical 
industry, as described above. It can be concluded that through configuration 
optimization, it is possible to decrease the flammable cloud volume to the greatest 
extent. Calculating the fire probability using the simulation result, Figure 3-21 
shows that with the application of configuration 4, the fire probability can be 
reduced to nearly one-tenth of the value caused by configuration 3. Also, due to 
the new design, the leaking gas is more easily ventilated from the system, reducing 
the fire risk duration by 20 seconds, which provides workers more time to take 
further safety measures. Regarding the fire probability and its risk duration, it can 
be concluded that the configuration in this case study is optimized by applying 
configuration 4. The improvement in fire safety caused by the difference between 
the configurations indicates the importance of a sufficient escape space for the 
leaked gas.  
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This case study demonstrates that the proposed methodology is a robust and 
practical model for analyzing the fire probability in a congested and complex 
processing area and is also a reliable tool for optimizing systems in terms of fire 
risk.  
 
Figure 3-20 The flammable cloud volume of systems with configurations 2, 3, 
and 4 
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Figure 3-21 The fire probability caused by configurations 3 and 4  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
Considering the temporal dependency of the fire accident scenario, a robust and 
practical model to analyze the fire probability in a congested and complex 
processing area is presented in this study, combining the BN, the SPN, and the 
CFD models. In the proposed methodology, the BN is applied to analyze the 
leakage source and calculate the probability of hydrocarbon leakage. The SPN 
model, coupled with Monte-Carlo simulation, is used to analyze the fuel leakage 
duration, which determines the ignition probability. The simulation result of SPN 
is also an essential parameter used in the numerical simulation. FLACS is used to 
conduct the fuel release and dispersion modeling, which determine the probability 
of a flammable vapour cloud.  
Applying the proposed approach to a case study of an FLNG, the probability of a 
fire accident in the processing unit is analyzed. According to the results, as the 
volume of the flammable cloud changes, the fire probability changes accordingly 
over time. With a different leakage duration, the probability of a fire accident as 
well as fire risk duration differs greatly. It can be concluded that a time-dependent 
fire probability analysis model is necessary. In addition, with the help of this model, 
it is possible to determine when workers should apply safety measures after a 
hydrocarbon leak. 
Through applying the proposed approach, a system optimization for fire accident 
probability can be conducted if the probability of fire is unacceptably high. In this 
study, a configuration optimization is applied as an example. Through measuring 
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the maximum fire probability and the fire risk duration, systems with different 
confinement and congestion levels are analyzed and an optimized configuration is 
proposed. The results show the importance of a sufficient escape space for the 
leaked gas. A system configuration is necessary when the probability of fire is 
unacceptably high. 
Possible improvements to the current work can be considered, including (1) 
implementing uncertainty propagation in the source data while simulating the 
hydrocarbon leakage probability; (2) consideration of interdependence of the 
parameters in modelling leakage probability; (3) analyzing the impact of safety 
strategies in preventing and controlling the leakage and fire accidents; (4) 
consideration of loss modelling in analyzing the leakage and fire accident 
scenarios and also the effectiveness of safety strategies. 
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Chapter 4. Could pool fire alone cause a domino effect? 
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Abstract 
A chain of accidents, also known as the domino effect, is responsible for a number 
of severe accidents in the chemical and process industries. As frequent and 
dangerous accidents occur in the chemical industry, the pool fire is often blamed 
as one of the primary accidents triggering a domino event. The present study is 
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devoted to analyzing whether the pool fire alone can cause a domino event in the 
current industry. Two models, including a solid flame model and numerical model, 
are applied to simulate the escalation vector caused by a pool fire, while the 
escalation probability of a domino effect is calculated using a probit model. This 
study collectively explores the potential factors that can cause a domino effect and 
determine credible accident scenarios. In addition, the case studies based on real 
accidents are conducted using the developed models to explore the possibility that 
pool fires cause a domino effect in the current industry. 
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4.1 Introduction  
A chain of accidents, also known as the domino effect, is responsible for a number 
of severe accidents in the chemical and process industries [21-23]. Such accident 
scenarios are very much more likely to cause huge damage to people, assets, and 
the environment than stand-alone accidents. Also, previous studies indicate that 
the frequency of the domino effect has increased in the chemical and process 
industries in recent decades [24, 25]. Disasters caused by the domino effect such 
as the BP Deepwater Horizon explosion[20], Buncefield oil depot fire[4], Puerto 
Rico’s CAPECO explosion and fire accident [5], and the Jaipur fire accident [26] 
have demonstrated the domino effect’s huge damage to society, which urgently 
claims researchers’ attention to this area.  
The term “domino effect” is used to describe a chain of accidents in which a 
primary accident escalates into higher-order accidents [27].As this type of frequent 
and dangerous accident occurs in the chemical industry, the pool fire is often 
blamed as one of the primary accidents triggering a domino event [27-32]. 
According to the study by Reniers et al. [32], the pool fire accounts for 44 percent 
of all accident scenarios that escalate into a domino effect. A pool fire is defined 
as a turbulent diffusion fire that occurs in a horizontal pool of flammable liquid 
fuel, such as liquefied natural gas (LNG), gasoline, etc. [6, 28]. This accident 
scenario usually occurs when the liquid fuel pool is ignited followed by the liquid 
fuel’s leakage, or the tank fire occurs in a fuel tank after it is damaged by other 
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accidents such as a vapour cloud explosion (VCE). A pool fire’s effect on adjacent 
equipment or human beings depends on many factors, including fuel properties, 
pool size, the distance between the fire and target equipment, and meteorological 
conditions. Under different conditions, the possibility that a pool fire will cause a 
domino event can vary.  
Several previous studies have been conducted on the domino effect caused by pool 
fires. In the study by Jujuly et al., a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) model is 
used to simulate an LNG pool fire and analyze its effect on the adjacent equipment. 
In this study, the wind speed is found to have a significant effect on the pool fire 
and its possibility of being causing a domino effect [28]. Khan and Abbasi 
conducted a series of studies on the domino effect, in which the pool fire is 
believed to be one of the principal accident scenarios that can escalate into a 
domino effect [24, 25, 33-35]. In a study by Khan and Abbasi, two failure modes, 
failure of the nearby equipment due to high-pressure buildup and equipment 
rupture due to material failure are considered to be the main failure modes of a 
vessel exposed to fire. A series of analytical formulas are derived in their study to 
calculate the escalation probability of a domino effect in the case of fire accidents 
[25].The research by Landucci et al. mainly focuses on the damage probability of 
equipment in domino events triggered by the fire. A simplified model was 
proposed to estimate the vessel time to failure (ttf) in the case of thermal radiation 
[30]. In addition, the studies by Cozzani et al. proposed a series of probit models 
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to analyze the escalation probability of a domino effect caused by various accident 
scenarios. The proposed probit models serve as simplified and practical ways for 
the probabilistic assessment of the domino effect [21, 31]. In several studies by 
Khakzad et al., the propagation sequence of the domino effect is analyzed with the 
help of a dynamic Bayesian network (DBN) and the probit method proposed by 
Cozzani et al.. The time-dependent feature of the domino effect is also considered 
and explored in these studies [27, 29, 36]. 
In the previous studies on the domino effect mentioned above, the pool fire is 
usually studied as one of the main causes of the domino effect. However, the 
domino effect is a phenomenon that can be caused by complex factors and their 
relationships, and whether the pool fire alone can cause a domino effect need to 
be identified. The present study is devoted to analyzing whether the pool fire alone 
can cause a domino effect in the current industry. The escalation vector leading to 
a domino effect is determined using both an analytical method and numerical 
method, while the escalation probability of a domino effect is calculated using a 
probit model based on the value of the escalation vector obtained in the last step. 
The conditions under which a pool fire can cause a domino effect are determined 
using the developed model. To collectively analyze the pool fire and its possibility 
of escalating into a domino event, several influencing factors are considered and 
explored in this study. Two case studies based on real accidents are conducted 
using the developed method in this study to explore the domino effect possibility 
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caused by fire in the current industry. 
The present paper is structured as follows. Section 2 recapitulates the developed 
methodology. Section 3 demonstrates the application of the methodology with an 
example, and then the influence of factors that affect pool fires is explored as a 
sensitivity analysis using the developed methodology. In Section 4, two case 
studies based on real accidents are conducted. The conclusions of the present study 
are presented in Section 5. 
 
4.2 Escalation Modeling of Domino Effect 
4.2.1 Escalation Vector Modeling 
A primary accident triggers a domino event by the effect of escalation vectors, 
which are physical effects, including fire impingement, fire engulfment, heat 
radiation, overpressure, and fragment projection caused by explosions [36]. To 
determine whether adjacent equipment is affected by the fire accident and 
escalates to a domino event, the escalation vectors exerted by previous events need 
to be accurately simulated. In the domino event solely caused only by a pool fire, 
only heat load needs to be considered among all escalation vectors. Also, Hottel’s 
research shows that in the case of the pool fire with a large diameter, the radiation 
dominates the heat transfer rather than convection [96]. Thus, in this section, the 
radiation caused by a pool fire accident is modeled as the only escalation vector. 
Table 4-1 presents the threshold criteria for the escalation vector caused by pool 
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fire accidents, according to the study by Cozzani et al. [31]. These values are based 
on the assumption that the heat load has an impact time of 15 minutes. The global 
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) also suggested a threshold value of 
30 kW/m2 [97]. In this study, the solid flame model and the numerical model 
are applied to simulate the heat load caused by the pool fire accidents. 
 
Table 4-1 Threshold values for escalation vectors related to pool fire [31] 
Escalation vector Target equipment Threshold value 
Radiation by pool fire 
and jet fire 
Atmospheric 15kW/m2 for more than 10min 
Pressurized 50kW/m2 for more than 10min 
 
4.2.1.1 Solid flame Model 
The solid flame model is a classical semi-empirical model that is widely used due 
to its simple application and accurate results. The solid flame model assumes that 
the heat flux only originates from the surface of the flame with a specific solid 
shape such as a cylinder or a cone [6]. In the case of a pool fire accident, the flame 
shape is assumed to be cylindrical, and the emitting power is calculated based on 
this assumption. Taking the flame shape into consideration, the heat flux caused 
by a pool fire can be calculated as a function of the surface-emitting power, the 
view factor and the atmospheric transmissivity, as suggested by Assael et al. [6]. 
The detailed steps of the method are summarized and presented in Figure 4-1.  
Based on the physical features of the pool and the environmental conditions, the 
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burning rate and the flame size can be determined based on the equations listed in 
this model. Then, the maximum surface-emitting power, which refers to the 
radiation from the flame's surface in cases when the soot is ignored, and the actual 
surface-emitting power, which takes the soot into consideration, can be determined. 
To calculate the flame’s effect on the adjacent equipment, the view factor, which 
is defined as the fraction of the emitted radiation that reaches the receptor per unit 
area, is calculated assuming the flame is a cylindrical solid shape. In addition, 
atmospheric transmissivity is a factor that contributes to the heat flux. In summary, 
the heat flux, q, at a certain distance from the center of the fire, is calculated from 
the value of the actual surface-emitting power, SEPact, the view factor, Fview, and 
the atmospheric transmissivity, τa, as shown in Equation (4.1). 
 
 q = SEPact × Fview × τa (4.1) 
 
When applying the solid flame model, more than one formula can be used to 
calculate a specific variable according to different conditions. The determination 
of formulas depends on the situation and the parameters’ availability. In this study, 
the solid flame model is conducted to explore the escalation vector of the domino 
effect caused by pool fires, and can also serve as a benchmark study for the CFD 
model. 
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Burning rate calculation [4, 
eq.C2.4-C2.6]: 
m’(kg/m2s)
Determine the pool features 
(size, physical 
characteristics, and so on) 
The maximum surface 
emitting power [4, eq.C2.9]: 
SPEmax(kW/m
2
) 
The actual surface emitting 
power  [4, eq.C2.14]: 
SPEact(kW/m
2
)
Flame size determination [4, 
eq.C2.12, eq. C2.13]
Determine the environmental 
condition
View factor determination [4, 
eq.C2.17]
Heat flux determination [4, 
eq.C2.30]:
q(kW/m
2
) 
 
Figure 4-1 Flow chart of heat load calculation using the solid flame model 
 
4.2.1.2 Numerical Model 
Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) models, also known as field models, are 
based on the numerical solution of Reynolds-Average Navier-Stokes equations. 
Compared with other models such as the solid flame model, a CFD model can 
provide a more accurate result, though a large computation time may be required 
[6]. In this study, Fluent, a widely used CFD software, is applied to simulate the 
domino event caused by a pool fire. Yang et al. analyzed the main difference 
among several CFD models for fire modeling [8]. Among these softwares, Fluent 
is known for its extensive simulation areas and advantages in meshing and result 
post-processing. Currently, Fluent is selected for numerical simulation, 
considering its accuracy of the simulation and the ability of post-processing.  
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Figure 4-2 summarized the simulation steps using the numerical model  
 
Figure 4-2 Flow chart of heat load calculation using the CFD model 
 
As shown in Figure 4-2, several equations and models need to be solved in the 
numerical model. Principal conservation equations used in the simulation are 
shown below [98, 99]: 
Continuity equation 
 
𝜕𝜌
𝜕𝑡
= ∇ ∙ (𝜌?⃑?) = 0 (4.2) 
Momentum equation 
 
𝜕
𝜕𝑡
(𝜌?⃑?) + ∇ ∙ (𝜌?⃑??⃑?) = −∇p + ∇ ∙ 𝜏̿ + 𝑝?⃑? + ?⃑? (4.3) 
where  
p is the static pressure,  
𝜏̿ is the stress tensor (described below), which is given by Equation (4.4) 
Scenario development Solve turbulence model
Solve energy modelMesh generation
Solution initialization Solve radiation model
Data post-processing
Solve continuous and 
momentum equation
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𝑝?⃑? is the gravitational body force.  
?⃑? contains other source terms that may arise from resistances, sources, etc. 
 𝜏̿ = 𝜇[(∇?⃑? + ∇?⃑?𝑇) −
2
3
∇ ∙ ?⃑?𝐼] (4.4) 
where µ is the molecular viscosity, I is the unit tensor and the second term on the 
right-hand side is the effect of volume dilation. 
 
Energy equation 
 
𝜕
𝜕𝑡
(𝜌ℎ) + ∇ ∙ (𝜌ℎ?⃑?) = ∇ ∙ [(𝑘 + 𝑘𝑡)∇T] + 𝑆ℎ (4.5) 
Where k is the molecular conductivity, 𝑘𝑡 is the conductivity due to turbulent 
transport, and the source term 𝑆ℎ includes any defined volumetric heat sources. 
 
In order to set up the CFD simulation to describe the pool fire, appropriate physical 
models need to be selected. The physical models used in this study are shown in 
Table 4-2.  
 
Table 4-2 Physical models used for fire simulation 
Sub-models in Fluent Physical models used for fire simulation 
Turbulence model k-omega, SST 
Combustion model Eddy-Dissipation 
Radiation model P1 radiation model 
 
To simulate the turbulence in the domain, the k-omega SST model is applied. This 
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is a hybrid model that combines the k-epsilon model in the free stream and the k-
omega model near the walls. Since the vessel needs to be considered in fire 
modeling, this feature can ensure the appropriate turbulent model is utilized in the 
computation domain. For combustion modeling, the Eddy-Dissipation model is 
applied in this study. This model assumes that chemical reactions occur much 
faster than turbulent mixing, so the average reaction rate is limited by the turbulent 
mixing rate. Once the turbulence occurs, the reaction will start. This assumption 
applies to most fuels, and it could provide a relatively accurate result. The P1 
radiation model is selected to calculate the Radiative Transfer Equation (RTE), 
due to its accuracy and less time being demanded for computation. In the case of 
large optical thickness, such as combustion, the P1 model can work reasonably.  
 
4.2.2 Escalation Probability 
Once the heat load caused by the flame is determined, the probability that a pool 
fire will escalate into a domino event can be calculated. 
In a fire accident scenario, the wall of the target vessel is heated due to the 
existence of a heat load, which may lead to the failure of the vessel. However, this 
heating process is a relatively slow process, since the equipment is resistant to fire 
and other disruptions. It is possible that the time is sufficient for applying 
mitigation and emergency actions before the escalation. Therefore, the escalation 
probability can be calculated based on the time that a heat load needs to cause the 
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failure of a vessel, which is called time to failure (ttf). This value is used to express 
the ability of the target equipment to resist a fire accident [30].  
In this study, the escalation probability is estimated using the probit model. The 
probit method has been widely used to analyze the relationship between a stimulus 
and a quantal response. In the current research, a probit model is applied to 
calculate the escalation probability of a domino event caused solely by a pool fire. 
For the calculation of the escalation probability, as the consequence of an 
escalation vector, the following Equations (4.6) and (4.7) are employed: 
 P =
1
(2π)1/2 
∫ exp (−
u2
2
)du
Pr−5
−∞
 (4.6) 
and 
 Pr = a + b ∗ ln(D) (4.7) 
 
where Pr is the probit value, a and b are the coefficients of the probit function. 
 
By determining different probit coefficients, the probit function can be used in 
various scenarios. Given the accident scenario of pool fire accidents, Cozzani et 
al. proposed a series of probit functions to relate the ttf to the probit value, as 
shown in Table 4-3 [31]. This model assumes that the radiation intensity and the 
time exposed to the heat are two principal factors contributing to an accident’s 
escalation. In this study, this probit model is applied to determine the escalation 
probability of pool fire accidents. 
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Table 4-3 Probit model used for the estimation of escalation probability [31] (I: 
radiation intensity (kW/m2); V: volume of the target unit (m3)) 
Escalation 
vector 
Target 
equipment 
Probit model 
Heat radiation Atmospheric Pr = 12.54 − 1.847 ln(ttf) 
ln(ttf) = −1.128 ln(I) − 2.667 ∗ 10−5V + 9.877 
Heat radiation Pressurized Pr = 12.54 − 1.847 ln(ttf) 
ln(ttf) = −0.95 ln(I) + 8.85V0.032 
 
4.3 Domino Effect Modeling 
For the sake of clarity, the application of the developed methodology is presented 
based on an example. In this section, the possibility that a single pool fire causes 
a domino effect on the adjacent tanks is analyzed using the developed 
methodology. In addition, the possible factors affecting the pool fire are also 
explored as a sensitivity analysis following the case study, and scenarios with 
different variables are taken into consideration in this section. 
4.3.1 Accident Scenario 
Figure 4-3 depicts the layout of the pool fire accident scenario studied in this 
section. The tank studied in this scenario is assumed to be an atmospheric storage 
tank filled with gasoline. It is assumed to be cylindrical, with a diameter of 30 
meters and a height of 16 meters. Caused by other incidents, a gasoline pool forms 
next to the tank, and has the potential to cause a pool fire, considering its 
flammable characteristic. In this case, the diameter of the fuel pool is assumed to 
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be constant and has the same value as the gasoline tank. This is assumed to be 
caused by another tank of the same size. Assuming that the distance between the 
tanks is equal to the diameter value of a tank, the distance between the tank and 
the fuel pool is also set to 30 meters. This section also considers the effect of wind 
on pool fire accidents. Considering the worst case of the wind direction, it is 
assumed that the wind direction is directly from the fuel pool towards the tank, 
and the wind speed is assumed to be 3 m/s. 
 
Figure 4-3 The layout of the accident scenario 
 
4.3.2 Escalation Vector modeling 
4.3.2.1 Solid flame Model 
Following the steps summarized in Figure 4-1, the solid flame model is applied to 
simulate the escalation vector of the domino effect, which is mainly the heat load 
in this case. Table 4-4 presents the modeling result of the pool fire accident using 
the solid flame model.  
In this modeling, the burning rate is calculated as 0.055 kg/m2s, using the 
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Zabetakis-Burgess method [100]. This method takes the characteristics of the 
flammable fuel and the pool size into consideration, and the value increases with 
the increase of the pool size. Due to the existence of the wind, the flame is tilted 
in the same direction as the wind, and the length is also elongated. In this case, the 
mean flame length is estimated as 51.7756 meters according to the Thomas 
method [101], which is a method sensitive to the pool size and environmental 
conditions. Given the physical feature of the fuel and the flame size, the maximum 
surface emitting power is calculated as 66.5265 kW/m2. Taking the soot into 
consideration, the actual surface emitting power is determined as 29.3053 
kW/m2 in this example. 
To calculate the flame’s impact on the adjacent equipment, the view factor is 
calculated assuming the flame to be a cylindrical solid shape in this case. In 
addition, atmospheric transmissivity is a factor that contributes to the heat flux, 
which is calculated as 0.7646 in this example. In summary, the heat flux is 
estimated as 8.2128 kg/m2s, according to Equation (1). 
 
Table 4-4 Modeling result of pool fire accident using solid flame model 
Variables Values 
Burning rate (kg/m2s) 0.055 
Mean flame length (m) 51.7756 
Angle of tilt (°) 43.49643 
View factor (-) 0.3665 
Maximum surface emitting power (kW/m2) 66.5265 
Actual surface emitting power (kW/m2) 29.3053 
Atmospheric transmissivity (-) 0.7646 
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Heat Flux (kW/m2) 8.2128 
 
4.3.2.2 Numerical Model 
Figure 4-4 illustrates the geometry developed in the CFD simulation. The 
dimension of the whole computation domain is set as 325m×250m×150m. While 
the fuel pool and the tank are placed in the central part, other boundaries are placed 
far enough to reduce the effects of the boundary, ensuring that the pool fire can be 
fully developed. Boundaries in this simulation comprise wind inlet, outlets, fuel 
pool, tank surface and the ground. Detailed boundary conditions used in this 
section are presented in Table 4-5. The boundary condition of the wind inlet is 
defined as a velocity inlet for forming a stable wind field with a speed of 3m/s. 
The other four boundaries, including three side outlets and an upper outlet, are 
defined as pressure outlets that simulate the open area. In addition, the boundary 
condition of the fuel pool is defined as the mass flow rate inlet to simulate the 
vaporization rate. Since the burning rate of the flammable material is observed to 
be equal to its vaporization rate in a pool fire, [6], the burning rate of the flammable 
material is first calculated to determine the mass flow rate in this study. According 
to the Zabetakis-Burgess Method [100], the burning rate is calculated to be 
0.055kg/m2s, and thus the mass flow rate is the same. The temperature at this 
boundary is set at 399.2K, which is believed to be the boiling point of gasoline. 
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Figure 4-4 Illustration of the CFD geometry 
 
Table 4-5 Boundary conditions applied in CFD simulation 
Surfaces Boundary condition 
Fuel pool Mass flow rate inlet 
Wind inlet Velocity inlet 
Outlets (3 sides and upper) Pressure outlet 
Tank surface Wall 
Ground Adiabatic wall 
 
To obtain a satisfactory mesh, computation with different meshes is applied until 
the simulation result is independent of the mesh quality. As shown in Figure 4-5, 
a tetrahedral mesh with total elements of 2231800 is used in this section. The finer 
mesh is applied to the fuel pool and the potential areas where the fire may develop, 
to capture the physical characteristics of the pool fire. In addition, the mesh around 
the surfaces, including the tank surface and the ground, is also refined. Inflation 
layers are applied to resolve the boundary layer and ensure that the y+ satisfies 
that the applicability of the SST k-w model. In this case, a coupled solver is used 
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for a steady state simulation of the combustion model. 
 
 
Figure 4-5 Mesh applied in the CFD simulation 
 
The flame profile obtained in the CFD simulation is shown in Figure 4-6. Under 
the influence of the wind, the flame tilts directly toward the tank; however, the 
tank is placed far enough for the flame to reach. According to the result shown in 
Figure 4-6 (a), the length is around 60 meters while the angle of tilt is around 40 
degrees, which is consistent with the result obtained from the solid flame model. 
Figure 4-6 (b) shows the radiation intensity profile of the flame. It generally ranges 
from 31.3 to 198 kW/m2 As the distance between the fuel pool and the tank 
increases, the influence of the flame decreases rapidly. 
Figure 4-7 shows the temperature and radiation intensity that reached the tank. As 
shown in Figure 4-7 (a), the tank surface is heated due to the existence of the fire 
nearby. The highest temperature is found to be 417.8 K. For most construction 
materials, the strength will dimish 40 percent when the temperature is higher than 
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670 K, while the material will not be affected drastically when the temperature is 
lower than 570 K [102]. Given the result in this example, the target tank is less 
likely to be drastically damaged in terms of the temperature threshold value. 
Figure 4-7 (b) shows the radiation intensity that the target tank received from the 
flame. The maximum heat load received from the pool fire is calculated as 9.82 
kW/m2 , which is close to the simulation result from the solid flame model. 
Therefore, results from the two models show good consistency, which proves the 
validity of both models. 
In summary, the two simulation methods show that the heat load is lower than 
the threshold value suggested by Cozzani et al. [31] and NFPA 59A [97]. This 
fact demonstrates that given the conditions in this example, the heat load caused 
by a fire is unlikely to drastically damage the target tank. 
 
 
    
(a) Temperature profile (b) Radiation intensity profile 
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Figure 4-6 Flame profile obtained in the CFD simulation 
 
 
Figure 4-7 Temperature and radiation profile in the tank surface 
 
4.3.3 Escalation Probability Modeling 
Based on the results obtained in the previous sections, the escalation probability 
of the domino effect is calculated using the probit model proposed by Cozzani et 
al. [31]. Table 4-6 summarizes the result obtained from the probit model.  
 
Table 4-6 Results of the probit model 
 Solid flame model CFD model 
Heat flux (kW/m2) 8.2128 9.8216 
Time to failure (s) 1.3396e+03, 22.3mins  1.0948e+03, 18.2mins 
Escalation probability 4.2389e-09 3.6028e-08 
 
According to the result, the ttf calculated from both the solid flame model and the 
CFD model exceeds 18 mins. Given this value and the tank size, the escalation 
probability calculated by the probit model is relatively low, and unlikely to cause 
  
(a) Temperature profile (b) Radiation intensity profile 
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a domino effect in this case. 
 
4.3.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
To comprehensively explore the factors affecting a pool fire, the study takes 
several essential factors into account, including pool size, the distance between 
fire and tank, and meteorological conditions such as wind speed. In this study, 18 
scenarios with various parameters, including pool dimensions, the distance 
between fire and target tank, and wind speed, are selected to explore the effect of 
possible factors that affect a domino event caused by a pool fire. Table 4-7 shows 
the selected scenarios with detailed parameters. Two kinds of pool dimension, 
including 20m and 30m, are selected considering the potential tank size; distances 
between the fire and target tank are selected based on the diameter of the target 
tank, D, and three degrees, from 0.5D to 1D, are applied in this section, where D 
is set to be 30 meters. The wind’s effect is also considered in this section, while 
the wind direction is assumed to be the worst case, which is from the pool fire 
directly to the target tank. Various wind speeds, from 1m/s to 5m/s, are selected 
and explored in this study considering from calm situation to gentle breeze 
according to the Beaufort wind scale. 
 
Table 4-7 Scenarios with value parameters  
 Pool 
diameter 
(m) 
Distance between fuel 
pool and target tank 
(m) 
Wind 
speed 
(m/s) 
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Scenario 1 20 0.5D 1 
Scenario 2 20 0.75D 1 
Scenario 3 20 1D 1 
Scenario 4 20 0.5D 3 
Scenario 5 20 0.75D 3 
Scenario 6 20 1D 3 
Scenario 7 20 0.5D 5 
Scenario 8 20 0.75D 5 
Scenario 9 20 1D 5 
Scenario 10 30 0.5D 1 
Scenario 11 30 0.75D 1 
Scenario 12 30 1D 1 
Scenario 13 30 0.5D 3 
Scenario 14 30 0.75D 3 
Scenario 15 30 1D 3 
Scenario 16 30 0.5D 5 
Scenario 17 30 0.75D 5 
Scenario 18 30 1D 5 
 
Table 4-8 demonstrates the simulation results for various scenarios using two heat 
load simulation models. In the solid flame model, it is assumed that the flame 
cannot reach the target equipment; therefore, the flame only affects the target 
equipment by thermal radiation, and other possible ways to affect the heat load 
value, including heat conduction and convection, are ignored in this model. 
Therefore, this model is not applicable in the case of an engulfed pool fire scenario, 
where the flame can reach the target equipment. In these cases, only the CFD 
model is applied to calculate the escalation vector caused by a pool fire, in this 
section. 
As the results show, the CFD model and the solid flame model provide close 
results, given the same parameters. The solid flame model provides a slightly 
 112 
 
lower value compared to the CFD model in most cases. Especially in the case 
when the flame is extremely close to the target equipment, the solid flame model 
provides a relatively lower value. This may be because many assumptions need to 
be made in the solid flame model, such as soot’s effect, which are hard to 
accurately determine based on experience, but these assumptions have a 
significant effect on the result calculated by the solid flame model, which may lead 
to the underestimation of the final result in this section. In addition, while the CFD 
model can be applicable in most of the scenarios, several scenarios cannot be 
simulated using a solid flame model, due to its application limit. In general, the 
solid flame model can provide a reasonable estimation of radiation intensity with 
a relatively short calculation time; however, its application limit and its result’s 
accuracy demonstrate that the CFD model is a more reliable model though 
sometimes the computation time can be long. 
According to the results from different scenarios, it can be found that these three 
factors do have big effects on the heat load received by the target tank from a pool 
fire. Given the same pool dimensions and wind speed, the heat load increases 
rapidly with the decrease of the distance between the fuel pool and the target tank. 
In several scenarios, such as Scenarios 4 and 13, though the distance of 0.25 D is 
reduced, the decreased distance allows the flame to reach the target tank. In these 
cases, the heat loads from radiation and conduction work collectively on the tank 
and cause relatively high values. In addition, it can also be concluded that the heat 
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load caused by a pool fire depends, to a large degree on the wind speed. For 
example, in Scenarios 1, 4, and 7, and Scenarios 10, 13, and 16, the big difference 
among results from these scenarios demonstrates that the flame is easily affected 
by wind. Also, a small difference, for example, 2 m/s in this case, can lead to a 
much more inclined flame, and thus cause much more heat load to be received by 
the target tank. Results in this section show that the pool’s dimensions have an 
effect on the heat load; however, varying pool dimensions do not cause such much 
change as the other two factors do. 
Given the heat load calculated, the ttf of the target tank and the escalation 
probability of a domino effect is calculated and shown in Table 4-9. As shown in 
the results, the maximum escalation probability that a scenario in this section can 
cause a domino effect is 0.4013, which is caused by the scenario in which the 
pool diameter is 30 meters, and the distance between the fuel pool and the target 
tank is 0.5D , with a wind speed of 5m/s. In addition, it can be concluded that the 
small increase in the heat load can greatly decrease ttf and then increase the 
escalation probability.  
In summary, most of the scenarios studied in this section have no capability to 
cause an escalation to a domino effect. Some accident scenarios such as 
Scenarios 7, 16, and 17, result in a high heat load being received by the target 
tank, which is likely to cause a domino effect, suggested by the simulation result. 
In these scenarios, due to the close distance between the fuel pool and tank or the 
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relatively high speed wind, the tank is engulfed by a pool fire, where not only 
thermal radiation but also heat conduction contribute to the heat load. Therefore, 
given a safe distance between the flame and the target tank, the pool fire alone is 
unlikely to case a domino effect.  
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Table 4-8 Heat load simulation results using solid-flame model and CFD model 
 Pool 
diameter 
(m) 
Distance 
between 
fuel pool 
and target 
tank (m) 
Wind 
speed 
(m/s) 
Heat load by 
solid-flame 
method 
(kW/m2) 
Maximum Heat 
load by CFD 
method (kW/m2) 
Scenario 1 20 0.5D 1 9.1995 12.5729 
Scenario 2 20 0.75D 1 6.4264 7.804 
Scenario 3 20 1D 1 4.61 4.235 
Scenario 4 20 0.5D 3 - 40.5246 
Scenario 5 20 0.75D 3 11.358 13.915 
Scenario 6 20 1D 3 7.198 9.79 
Scenario 7  20 0.5D 5 - 91.260 
Scenario 8 20 0.75D 5 - 43.721 
Scenario 9 20 1D 5 - 22.934 
Scenario 10 30 0.5D 1 10.114 11.344 
Scenario 11 30 0.75D 1 7.648 8.264 
Scenario 12 30 1D 1 4.893 3.494 
Scenario 13 30 0.5D 3 - 34.019 
Scenario 14 30 0.75D 3 16.3015 17.1741 
Scenario 15 30 1D 3 8.2 9.8216 
Scenario 16 30 0.5D 5 - 115.55 
Scenario 17 30 0.75D 5 - 98.970 
Scenario 18 30 1D 5 - 52.233 
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Table 4-9 Time to failure and escalation probability calculated by probit method 
 Heat load by solid-flame method 
(kW/m2) 
Maximum Heat load by CFD 
method (kW/m2) 
Time to failure 
(s) 
Escalation 
probability 
Time to failure 
(s) 
Escalation 
probability 
Scenario 1 1.179e+03 1.673e-08 828.642 5.539e-07 
Scenario 2 1.767e+03 1.809e-10 1.419e+03 2.245e-09 
Scenario 3 2.570e+03 1.680e-12 2.828e+03 4.716e-13 
Scenario 4 - - 221.321 0.0075 
Scenario 5 929.286 1.856e-07 739.062 1.580e-06 
Scenario 6 1.555e+03 8.025e-10 1.0990e+03 3.471e-08 
Scenario 7  - - 88.580 0.229 
Scenario 8 - - 203.157 0.012 
Scenario 9 - - 420.638 1.478e-04 
Scenario 10 1.059e+03 5.052e-08 930.580 1.831e-07 
Scenario 11 1.452e+03 1.741e-09 1.330e+03 4.577e-09 
Scenario 12 2.403e+03 4.025e-12 3.513e+03 2.363e-14 
Scenario 13 - - 269.618 0.0026 
Scenario 14 618.212 7.443e-06 582.898 1.212e-05 
Scenario 15 1.340e+03 4.239e-09 1.095e+03 3.603e-08 
Scenario 16 - - 67.878 0.4013 
Scenario 17 - - 80.836 0.2834 
Scenario 18 - - 166.222 0.0284 
 
4.4 Case study 
4.4.1 Caribbean Explosion and Fire Accident 
4.4.1.1 Accident Description 
In October 2009, a large explosion occurred at the Caribbean Petroleum 
Corporation (CAPECO) oil refinery and oil depot in Bayamón, Puerto Rico [5]. 
Three people were injured in this accident, but fortunately, no fatalities were 
reported. The accident started with an overflowed gasoline storage tank at the tank 
farm; then, a 107-acre vapour cloud formed quickly over the facility after the fuel 
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aerosolized. The vapour cloud was ignited subsequently in the wastewater 
treatment area of the facility and led to a huge explosion. Multiple tank fires 
followed the explosion and burned for nearly 60 hours. Due to the subsequent 
explosions and fire, 17 of the 48 petroleum storage tanks were damaged 
significantly. 
Figure 4-8 shows the layout of the tank farm at CAPECO. In the case study, Tank 
407, which is assumed to have a height of 20m and a diameter of 30m, is selected 
as the target equipment, to explore its possibility of being affected by adjacent 
fires and escalating into a domino event. Three adjacent tanks, including Tank 405, 
Tank 408, and Tank 409, were damaged due to VCE, and then formed multiple 
tank fires. Considering their proximity, pool fires occurring in these tanks are 
simulated as the main sources of the heat load affecting the target tank in this study. 
The diameter of Tank 409 is 36.58 meters, according to the CSB accident 
investigation report [5], while the diameters of Tank 405 and Tank 408 are 
assumed to be 15 meters and 30 meters, respectively. In this study, the pool fire 
that occurs in each tank is assumed to have the same dimension as the 
corresponding tank. A light breeze of 3m/s is reported in the accident investigation 
[5], which is from the left side, as photographed in Figure 4-8. 
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Figure 4-8 Layout of the tank farm of CAPECO 
 
4.4.1.2 Escalation Vector Modeling 
Table 4-10 presents the heat load estimated by the solid flame model. In the case 
of multiple tank fires, the heat load caused by each tank fire (Q1  to Q3 ), is 
calculated separately using the solid flame model. As shown in the result, the fire 
occurring in Tank 409 contributes the most among the three tank fires, which is 
caused by its proximity to the target tank, having the largest pool size among the 
three tanks, with a relatively high view factor, due to its location and the wind 
direction. Tank 408 has a similar pool size as Tank 409; however, the distance to 
the target tank is relatively long compared to Tank 409, and the wind does not tilt 
the fire directly to the target tank. These reasons lead to a lower view factor 
compared to that of Tank 409, which causes the fire in Tank 408 to have a less 
thermal effect on the target tank. Though Tank 405 is the closest to the target tank 
among others, the wind tilts the flame in the direction away from the target tank, 
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and the small size of the fuel pool also explains its smaller effect on the target tank. 
The sum of the heat load caused by three tank fires, Qtotal1, is calculated as 16.63 
kW/m2 , which is believed to be the total radiation that the target equipment 
received from the adjacent multiple tank fires. Given the results from this model, 
the total heat load is slightly higher than the threshold value suggested by Cozzani 
et al. [31], but satisfies the requirement by NFPA 59A [97]. 
 
Table 4-10 Simulation result of Caribbean accident using the solid flame model  
 Heat load (kW/m2) 
Q1 (from Tank 405) 1.23 
Q2 (from Tank 408) 3.54 
Q3 (from Tank 409) 11.86 
Qtotal1 16.63 
 
The results from the CFD model are shown in Figure 4-9. Under the influence of 
the wind, the flames tilt toward the tank, and affect approximately half of the 
targeted tank by varying degrees of heat load. Three tank fires affect the tank 
collectively and exert a heat load with the maximum value of 14.53 kW/m2 on 
the tank surface, as shown in the results. This value is slightly lower than that of 
the solid flame model and the threshold value of radiation intensity, which is 
15 kW/m2.  
Though the heat loads calculated from the two models are slightly different, both 
values are close to the threshold value for an atmospheric tank suggested by 
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Cozzani et al. [31], which indicates that the multiple tank fires in this case have 
the potential to cause damage to the target equipment once the exposure time is 
sufficient. 
 
Figure 4-9 Simulation result of Caribbean accident using the CFD model 
 
4.4.1.3 Escalation Probability Modeling 
Table 4-11 Escalation probability results of the Caribbean accident 
 Solid-flame model CFD model 
Heat flux (kW/m2) 16.63 14.53 
Time to failure (s) 560.5502 652.7477 
Escalation probability 1.6659e-05 4.6951e-06 
 
Given the heat load calculated in the previous section, the corresponding ttf and 
the probability of escalating to a domino event can be calculated. The results 
calculated using the probit method are presented in Table 4-11. The ttf calculated 
from the two models is approximately 10 mins, which means that the multiple fires 
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in this case need to last for at least 10 minutes to cause significant damage to the 
target tank. However, the escalation probability calculated using the 
corresponding ttf by the probit model is still low, which indicates that, given the 
conditions in this case, although the multiple pool fires have the potential to cause 
damage to the target equipment, they may not be significant, or have the ability to 
completely damage the equipment. Therefore, in this case study, the accident may 
not escalate into a domino event.  
This conclusion is consistent with the result shown in the accident investigation 
report, that Tank 409 suffered a certain degree of damage during the accident, but 
did not catch fire and escalate into the next-level accident, even when multiple 
tank fires existed nearby [5]. 
 
4.4.2 Jaipur Fire Accident 
4.4.2.1 Accident Description 
The explosion and fire accident occurred on October 2009 at the Indian Oil 
Corporation (IOC) oil depot in Jaipur caused 12 deaths and over 300 injuries. The 
fires lasted for over one week and resulted in huge losses of people and assets, as 
well as harming the environment. To guarantee that residences were not affected 
by the accident, half a million people were evacuated from the affected area [26]. 
The accident started with a fuel leakage on the transfer line from the tank to the 
Motor Spirit (MS) pump. The leaked liquid fuel generated vapour rapidly and 
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formed a vapour cloud that covered the entire installation. A huge VCE occurred 
subsequently and destroyed the building and equipment within the depot. In 
addition, 9 of the 11 tanks were damaged in this explosion and soon caught fire. 
The multiple tank fires caused by the VCE spread subsequently to the remaining 
two MS tanks (Tank 409 A and B). Possible factors that caused the MS tanks 409 
A/B to catch fire include explosion, nearby multiple tank fires and so on [26]. In 
this case study, Tank 409 A is selected as the target equipment, and the possibility 
of it being affected by the multiple tank fires nearby is explored.  
As shown in Figure 4-10, nine tanks that caught fire due to the first VCE are 
located northwest of the MS tanks 409 A/B. Considering the worst case, the wind 
direction is set from MS tanks 401 to the target tank, MS tank 409 A, with a wind 
velocity of 3 m/s. In this study, fires in three MS tanks, Tanks 401 A/B/C, are 
selected and simulated as the main sources of the heat load affecting the target 
tank. According to the investigation report, Tanks 401 A/B/C have diameters of 
24 meters and heights of 15 meters, while Tanks 409 A/B have diameters of 28 
meters and heights of 15 meters [26]. 
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Figure 4-10 Layout of the tank farm in IOC 
 
4.4.2.2 Escalation Vector Modeling 
The results obtained from the solid flame model are shown in Table 4-12. Due to 
the long distance between the tank fire and the target tank, the view factors 
calculated by the model are extremely low, which accounts for that most of the 
thermal radiation from the flames not being received by the target tank. As shown 
in the result, the radiation received from each tank fire is only around 0.2 kW/m2, 
and the total heat load that the target tank received from the tank fires is calculated 
to be 0.598 kW/m2, which is far below the threshold for heat load. 
In the CFD modeling, as shown in Figure 4-11, the flames are tilted toward the 
target tank under the influence of the wind. However, given this layout, even if the 
wind direction is considered to be the worst case, which is directly from Tank 401 
to Tank 409, the flame is still very far from the target tank and hardly affects it. 
The results from the CFD model present a bit higher heat load than that from the 
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solid flame model, and still much lower than the threshold value. By comparing 
the heat load simulated from the two models and the threshold value suggested by 
Cozzani et al. [31], it can be concluded that the pool fires are unlikely to cause any 
significant damage to the target equipment.  
 
Table 4-12 Simulation result of Jaipur fire accident using the solid-flame model 
 Heat load (kW/m2) 
Q1 (from Tank 401A) 0.135 
Q2 (from Tank 401B) 0.193 
Q3 (from Tank 401C) 0.270 
Q (total heat load) 0.598 
 
  
Figure 4-11 Simulation result of Jaipur fire accident using the CFD model 
 
4.4.2.3 Escalation Probability Modeling 
After the heat load is simulated, the ttf and the escalation probability are calculated, 
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as shown in Table 4-13. With a low value of the heat load, the ttf calculated from 
both models is very high, more than seven hours. Therefore, the escalation 
probability, which is calculated from ttf, is extremely low in the results derived 
from both models. In terms of the ttf and the escalation probability, the results 
prove again that in this case, the pool fires alone have almost no ability to cause 
significant damage to the target tank and escalate into a domino event. Instead of 
the pool fires, it is the other factors or the collective effect of several factors that 
cause the target tanks to be damaged and catch fire. 
 
Table 4-13 Escalation probability results of Jaipur accident 
 Solid-flame model CFD model 
Heat flux (kW/m2) 0.598 1.838 
Time to failure (s) 2.7191e+04 7.6624e+03 
Escalation probability 5.2797e-30 1.3573e-19 
 
In the accident investigation report by the Independent Inquiry Committee [26], 
which is constituted by the Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas (MoP&NG), the 
possible accident scenarios in this accident were analyzed and modelled, including 
flash fires, pool fires, jet fires and VCE. Each scenario was simulated considering 
various influencing factors to explore their effects in the accident. In the simulation 
result of the pool fires, since the distance is too far from the fuel pool, the heat 
load caused only by pool fires in the first 9 tanks is extremely low, which means 
there is no possibility to cause damage to the target tank. This result is consistent 
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with the result obtained in this study. In addition, the investigation report also 
shows that the overpressure caused by the VCE can affect the farther places, which 
has the ability to result in the failure of the target tank. 
In summary, this case study as well as the result from the investigation report show 
that in this case, the pool fire alone cannot cause significant damage and escalate 
into a domino event. It is other factors’ effect or the collective effect of several 
factors which contribute to the failure of the tank, resulting in a domino event. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This study explores the possibility that the pool fire alone causes a domino effect. 
By applying the developed method, three factors that have the potential to affect a 
pool fire’s impact, including pool dimension, distance between fire and target tank, 
and wind speed, are determined and verified. According to the results in this study, 
it can be concluded that the pool fire does have the potential to cause damage to 
the adjacent equipment. As shown in the sensitivity analysis, in the case of fire 
engulfment, the heat load caused by the pool fire do has a significant possibility 
of causing a domino effect; however, as shown in other cases, as long as the layout 
guarantees a safe distance among tanks, the pool fire alone is unlikely to cause the 
failure of the target tank and thus the domino effect. 
In addition, as shown in the two case studies, a pool fire alone sometimes may not 
cause a domino effect in the current industry. Other factors, such as explosion and 
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hydrocarbon leakage, work together with a pool fire to escalate into a domino 
event, for example, the results shown in the case study of the Jaipur fire accident.  
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Chapter 5. Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 
Fire is among the most dangerous accidents in chemical and hydrocarbon 
processing industries. This thesis analyzed several potential fire scenarios in the 
hydrocarbon production and processing industry and conducted risk assessments 
of fire risks. 
Chapter 1 provides a brief introduction to the fire risks which threaten people in 
the current industry. Several current models for fire simulation are introduced, 
along with potential fire accident scenarios, such as their effects on offshore 
facilities and their likelihood of causing a domino effect. 
Chapter 2 proposes a procedure to study potential fire accident scenarios in an 
offshore facility with different ignition source locations, and this procedure helps 
to design the safety measures. In this chapter, 14 credible scenarios with different 
ignition source locations are explored. The results are extracted to determine the 
most dangerous scenarios. In addition, the ranges of safety measures are also 
studied in this chapter to determine their effectiveness to prevent fires and mitigate 
their impact. Thus, this chapter provides a simple and efficient way to analyze the 
impact of key design parameters of safety measures. This work emphasizes that 
an FLNG layout must be considered with the utmost care since it is the most 
effective measure in limiting a potential LNG release and subsequent dispersion 
effect, and directly influences the fire dynamics and thus limits the potential 
damage. 
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In chapter 3, an integrated model is proposed to assess the probability of fire 
accidents considering their time-dependent features, by combining a conditional 
probability approach – the Bayesian network (BN) - with a time-dependent 
scenario evolution approach, Stochastic Petri Nets (SPN). The CFD tool is used to 
estimate the time-dependent scenario consequences. The outcome of the model is 
fire probability as a function of time and location caused by a specific leak rate 
and leak duration. Through applying the proposed approach, a system optimization 
for fire accident probability can be conducted if the probability of fire is 
unacceptably high. The results in this work show that a time-dependent probability 
analysis model is necessary for fire accidents. In addition, through measuring the 
maximum fire probability and the fire risk duration, systems with different 
confinement and congestion levels have different fire risk. The results show the 
importance of a sufficient escape space for the leaked gas, and also the necessity 
to conduct a system configuration when the probability of fire is unacceptably high. 
Chapter 4 explores the possibility that pool fires alone cause a domino effect. 
While two models, a solid flame model and numerical model, are applied to 
simulate the heat load caused by pool fires, a probit model is used to assess the 
escalation probability of a domino effect caused by pool fires. Several potential 
influencing factors that have effects on the pool fire results are explored in a 
sensitivity study. In addition, two case studies based on real accidents are 
conducted to analyze the pool fire’s impact on the current industry. The results 
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demonstrate that a pool fire alone sometimes may not cause a domino effect in the 
current industry. It is other factors, such as explosion and hydrocarbon leakage, 
work together with a pool fire to escalate into a domino event, for example, the 
results shown in the case study of the Jaipur fire accident. 
Finally, this chapter provides a summary of the work and highlights the 
achievements of this research. The following recommendations are provided for 
future work to improve the analysis of fire risk presented in this thesis. 
First of all, since a fire accident in an offshore facility has a considerable potential 
to escalate into an explosion accident, the proposed numerical model for effective 
analysis of safety measures can be extended to take the transfer from fire to 
explosion accident into consideration. In addition, except for the location of the 
ignition sources, more factors can contribute to the result of the fire consequence, 
which could be the future’s work. Besides, due to the complex relationship among 
factors causing a leakage, the interdependence of the parameters in modelling 
leakage probability need more attention, as well as more uncertainty, these factors 
can be considered in the time-dependent model in future work. For the study of 
the domino effect, a comprehensive study of previous accidents caused by the 
domino effect can be conducted to provide a clearer view. It would be better if the 
future work can focus on which combination of the accidents contribute most to 
the domino effect, and how to provide any preventative measures to avoid these 
combinations.  
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